The European Commission Guidelines on Prohibited Artificial Intelligence Practices are currently lacking a direct focus as well as concrete examples related to elections. A more explicit focus on elections is necessary, as the current guidelines remain indirect on the topic.
The Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), the new EU Regulation that introduces rules for AI systems according to their risk level, entered into force in August 2024. The rules will be implemented over the next few years with a phased application period. As part of the implementation, the European Commission has released Guidelines on Prohibited Artificial Intelligence Practices.
While the EU Commission Guidelines are a comprehensive legal tool, they currently lack an election integrity perspective. AI’s role is shaping public discourse, influencing voter behaviour. This is why safeguarding electoral integrity must be addressed with greater clarity and urgency, through effective enforcement mechanisms and a thorough assessment to evaluate their real-world impact of AI through ex-post analyses based on concrete cases and incidents.
Half of the world’s population is under 30. Yet, young peopleare still overwhelmingly underrepresented in politics, from parliaments to local governments. The barriers limiting young people’s involvement in public affairs are multiple and systemic: constitutional restrictions, political instability, lack of interest in youth development, poor civic education, vague youth-focused policies, limited leadership and/or technical skills, and human rights abuses are all challengespreventing young people from engaging in democratic processes.
Despite barriers to participation, civic movements and individual activists have played an increasingly important role in driving democratic processes during the last decade. Informal civic activism has been intensifying across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe, and youth are an active part of these movements, demonstrating assertive citizenship. Among other positive examples, we recently saw this in Serbia, where young Serbs are rejecting the narrative that emigration is the only way to have any chance at a better life, calling for systemic reforms to ensure accountability and prevent further tragedies similar to the canopy collapse at the Novi Sad station in November 2024.
At the institutional level, young people struggle to be taken seriously by established politicians, with important consequences for the state of democracy, which indeed cannot be a true democracy if it is not inclusive of its young citizens. Young people often navigate systems created for and by adults and are called to provide contributions only when elders see it as needed or beneficial. The limited opportunities for youth engagement that exist are often not institutionalised or do not allow youth to shape decision-making processes. For instance, in many countries, young people cannot run for political office due to age restrictions.
How can we make sense of the data available to transform it into meaningful action?
The European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) is pleased to announce that the Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI) will be officially launched on 18 June 2025.
This groundbreaking tool connects the dots between global data and the lived realities behind the numbers, offering a powerful insight into youth political participation across the world. From civic engagement to electoral inclusion, this new index provides a comprehensive overview of where and how young people are shaping democracy through data through several dimensions:
Youth Socio-Economic dimension: focused on factors that impact youth participation, including access to education, the level of democracy, and youth unemployment rates;
Civic Space dimension: aimed at better understanding young people’s involvement and engagement in civil society, including through digital means, as well as their engagement with social movements aimed at strengthening the youth voice;
Political Affairs dimension: focused on youth engagement and representation in parliaments, political parties, and local governments;
Elections dimension: focused on better understanding youth access to and use of the ballot box.
Against this backdrop, the GYPI aspires to become a vital resource for a deeper understanding of youth engagement trends in over 130 countries.
To mark the launch, EPD will organise an evening of insight and inspiration – featuring a dynamic presentation of the index, a powerful photo exhibition and a chance to connect over drinks with fellow advocates for democracy.
In the last decade, civil society across the world has experienced significant change, as new civic movements and individual activists have played an increasingly important role in driving democratic processes. Especially since the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent closing of civic space in 2020, such informal civic activism has intensified across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe, and has taken on new issues and tactics.
Tightly connected to this trend is the dramatic rise in protest activity that has dominated many media headlines globally. This increase in innovative, youth, and non-violent activism is a manifestation of assertive citizenship, and it is notable that this trend has unfolded even as most policy and analytical attention has been on democratic backsliding.
This report examines the implications of this new phase of intense informal civic activism for democracy and democracy-support strategies. While much has been written on social movements, and the report reinforces many familiar points, this analysis offers up-to-date evidence of an emerging phase of activism and finds new developments in international support strategies. The report draws on evidence from five countries: Belarus, Georgia, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Thailand. We selected these countries because they have all experienced civic uprisings or mobilisations over the past decade and have all attracted significant international democracy funding. Differences across regime types and regions also played a role in the selection process and are detailed in our methodological approach.
Thailand has since 2020 witnessed dynamic civic movements that have demanded democracy and advocated reform of the military and the monarchy.Belarus has seen its largest and most sustained civic mobilisation since the stolen 2020 presidential election. In Senegal, civic movements played a crucial role in ousting an autocratising regime in 2024. In Georgia, new grassroots movements have emerged in response to democratic backsliding since 2019 and transformed into a large-scale anti-government mobilisation. And in Nicaragua, democracy activists have adopted many new informal strategies as they defend themselves against an especially repressive regime.
Across these countries, the report notes emerging new features of informal activism. One particularly important change lies in the relationship between novel social movements and more established, formal civil society organisations (CSOs). New forms of coordination are emerging between the informal and formal parts of global civil society. This incipient phase of activism holds great democratic potential but has also attracted the attention of undemocratic regimes: over the last decade, autocratic and illiberal leaders have used brutal measures to suppress these emerging forms of civic mobilisation. Beyond jailing and brutally assaulting members of civic movements, regimes have attempted to discredit them with accusations of orchestrating foreign-led revolutions and attempts to destabilise their countries. International democracy support has yet to catch up with the changing shape of global civil society. As political developments such as the decision by the United States (US) to cut democracy aid reinforce autocratic dynamics, the role of civic mobilisation and civic movements becomes all the more important. With the European Commission currently drawing up a European civil society strategy, a deeper understanding of civil society trends is vital. Closer examination of possible strategies towards this shifting civil society landscape is required. Most democracy-support donors remain ambivalent on the question of whether they should back informal civic movements and individual activists, given the lack of institutionalisation and accountability mechanisms. This report argues that donors should support the new phase of civic movements, but in tandem with, rather than separately from, their existing support for CSOs.
The undersigned civil society, human rights, journalist and media support organisations call on the European Commission to strengthen the rule of law dialogue, improve the impact of the Rule of Law Report’s recommendations and take decisive action against systematic human rights violations in EU Member States.
In 2025, the European Commission will publish its sixth annual Rule of Law Report – the first after the new Commission took office. The European Commission President, Ursula Von der Leyen – in her political guidelines and in the mission letter to the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, Michael McGrath – reaffirmed the Commission’s commitment to upholding the rule of law, as a priority for the new College. Furthermore, one of the new additions was the explicit link of the rule of law recommendations to the access of EU funds as well as the extension of the Rule of Law Report to also cover the Single Market dimension.
The profound political shifts witnessed in 2024, a year marked by electoral upheavals and changing political landscapes across Europe and the world, are testing the resilience of democratic institutions, highlighting the need for continued and coordinated action in protecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in the EU. Upholding the rule of law is a top priority, and strengthening the Rule of Law Report is essential to this effort. Making it more effective requires closer collaboration with all key actors committed to the rule of law in the EU, including civil society organisations (CSOs), journalists, and academics.
While there have been notable improvements in the reporting process, particularly with more engagement on stakeholder consultations and extended reporting in some areas, concerns remain regarding the quality and effectiveness of the recommendations in its national chapters as well as their concrete follow-up.
The upcoming report will be a key test of the new Commission’s ability to address these challenges and ensure that its recommendations translate into tangible action to uphold the rule of law standards across the EU Member States and the EU institutions. The following recommendations aim to strengthen the connection between the Rule of Law Report and other relevant mechanisms and to address, among others, issues related to the implementation of court rulings, the protection of civic space and media freedom.
Our main recommendations to the Commission are:
Rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights must be key priorities in the new Commission’s policies.
Improve the link between the Rule of Law Report and an enhanced rule of law toolbox.
Strengthen the link between the rule of law and the EU budget.
Continue the Rule of Law Report and improve its qualitative assessment analysis.
Take firm and systematic action against the non-implementation of court rulings.
Address continuing concerns regarding civic space and human rights.
Protect freedom of expression, freedom of information and media freedom.
Improve the visibility and awareness of the Rule of Law Report.
Ensure the EU’s own actions do not undermine the rule of law.
We welcome the decision of the European Commission President to make ‘Protecting our democracy, upholding our values’ a core priority of this mandate. In designing its next multi year budget (MFF), the EU must decide what world it wants to offer to European citizens at home and internationally. In many countries we are seeing a concerted attempt to roll back efforts to create societies defined by inclusive values, media freedom, equality of rights for all, and independent institutions, principles that are inherent to democracy. Supporting democracy means nurturing reliable partnerships and supporting the EU’s global influence. EU democracy assistance is a vital instrument to help build democratic institutions and endow them with resilience all over the world.
Support for democracy is part of the DNA of the European Unionbut it also serves its self-interest. Strengthening EU values simultaneously means boosting the resilience and therefore security of the societies of EU Member States and that of its neighbourhood. Evidence shows that a more democratic world is a more peaceful world. The main objective of the EU’s security strategy is to protect our way of life, centered around democracy and respect for human rights. Any holistic, well-thought-out security strategy for Europe cannot but have support for democracy at its core.
Improving efficient corruption prevention mechanisms and stable investment frameworks contribute to the European economy’s competitiveness. More transparency and participation in policy design help to cut red tape and build trust across sectors. Democracy is, therefore, both a project of its own value and an intrinsic tool to deliver on the priorities of the European Commission.
Ensuring strong democracies in European Member States is the basis for combating challenges such as the rise of extremism, election interference, the spread of manipulative information and threats to journalists. Threats to democracy, within Europe and outside, threaten the very existence of the EU as a political project that creates space for citizens to thrive and benefit from their fundamental liberties. The European Commission as the guardian of the treaties has the duty to protect and promote democracy within its borders and beyond.
With the steady erosion of democratic processes and freedoms across the world, words and good intentions will only go so far. It is essential to integrate fundamental rights and democratic governance across EU policy areas. The EU and Member States need to dedicate resources in a more efficient and strategic way to respond more effectively to threats through the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework.
As a community of democracy support organisations we, therefore recommend to:
Link the EU budget more effectively to Article 2 TEU
Ensure a coherent and efficient approach to information integrity
Put democracy at the heart of the enlargement process
Embed democracy at the centre of Global Gateway for the EU’s long-term strategic interests
Maintain instruments to support democracy, human rights and civil society in external action
Create a budget line for democratic openings abroad
International democracy-support organisations have spent two decades grappling with unfavourable trends and various types and degrees of democratic regression. In doing so, they have neglected to design strategies for responding to moments of democratic opportunity.
Even though the general state of global democracy has worsened, there have been some positive democratic breakthroughs or reversals of authoritarian trends. In several countries, a period of democratic erosion has given way to more positive democratic dynamics. The nature of such reversals varies enormously across countries, and not all of them lead to a sustained process of democratisation. Yet, their occurrence is significant and merits closer attention.
Case studies
Our report delves into six case studies in which moments of democratic opportunity have opened in recent years:
In Brazil, the 2022 presidential election saw Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva take power from his illiberal predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro. (Oliver Stuenkel)
In Montenegro, the 2020 parliamentary election was won by a reform-oriented opposition coalition after years of autocratic drift. (Biljana Spasovska)
In Guatemala, presidential candidate Bernardo Arévalo won the 2023 election and then defeated an attempted coup. (Marielos Chang)
In Thailand, the 2023 general election saw the military-backed government suffer defeat to the pro-democracy opposition party. (Janjira Sombatpoonsiri)
In Zambia, the opposition candidate won the 2021 presidential election to oust the autocratising incumbent. (Nic Cheeseman)
In Bangladesh, protests in 2024 dislodged an increasingly autocratic regime from power. (Naomi Hossain)
In all six cases, moments of democratic opportunity opened up through elections – except in Bangladesh, where protests ousted the president some months after a regime-controlled election. These episodes show differing degrees of autocratic reversal, and not all are cases of deep, successful democratic turnaround. After their breakthrough moment, most of the countries continued on a broadly democratic path, although with still imperfect re-democratisation. In Montenegro and Zambia, the new governments have stalled on democratic reforms. The outcome of the regime shift is still uncertain in Bangladesh, while Thailand has suffered the most pronounced slide back towards autocracy and, for now, looks like a decidedly missed democratic opportunity.
Each case study examines the domestic factors that generated positive change and then assesses how far EU policies assisted these factors. The case studies do not provide general overviews of EU policies towards the countries but rather analyse how well EU interventions functioned just before, during, and after these crunch points. We assume change is driven mainly by domestic factors, and our focus on the EU does not imply the contrary; we look at how far external influences helped or hindered domestic drivers.
This article is an excerpt from the introduction of the report, written by Richard Youngs, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and co-founder of the European Democracy Hub.
The European Democracy Hub is a joint initiative of the European Partnership for Democracy and Carnegie Europe.
EPD and a group of 66 organisations working to support and develop democracy welcome the European Commission’s initiative to create a European Democracy Shield as a coordinated effort to support democracy in and around Europe. This initiative is particularly relevant in the current context of global democratic backsliding.
Given the Shield’s thematic focus on the information space, election integrity, and civic engagement, we see it as a natural successor to the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP). EDAP saw the introduction of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), the Anti-SLAPP Directive, a revamped Code of Practice on Disinformation, and the Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA), among others, which are all vital steps towards creating healthier European democracies. Complementing the EDAP, legislation was passed such as the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the AI Act that regulate technological advancements in line with democratic standards.
Taking into consideration the Commission’s core priorities on democracy, including the rule of law and fundamental rights, the Shield should use this legislative basis with increased determination and ambition, to achieve concrete improvements over the next mandate.
In order to ensure that the European Democracy Shield effectively responds to the challenges faced by democracy in Europe, it is vital that it addresses a series of priorities.
Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives Foundation (BILI)
Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH)
Center for Democracy and Technology
Centre for Public Policy Providus (Latvia)
Centrul de Politici şi Reforme (CPR Moldova)
CFI Développement Médias (CFI)
Civil Liberties Union for Europe
Club de Madrid
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
Croatian Platform for International Citizen Solidarity (CROSOL) (Croatia)
The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation
Democracy Reporting International (DRI)
Democratic Society
Demos Helsinki
DW Akademie
Egmont Institute
Europe Jacques Delors
European Association for Local Democracy (ALDA)
European Centre for Press and Media Freedoms (ECPMF)
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
European Partnership for Democracy (EPD)
Fondazione Openpolis (Italy)
Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
Fund Safe Ukraine 2030
Global Forum for Media Development
The Good Lobby
Human Rights Monitoring Institute (Lithuania)
ILGA-Europe (European region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association)
ImplicarePlus.org (Romania)
Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
International Media Support (IMS)
International Press Institute (IPI)
International IDEA
Kofi Annan Foundation
Lie Detectors (LD)
Make.org
Media Diversity Institute
Netherlands Helsinki Committee (NHC)
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
Network of Estonian Non-Profit Organisations (NENO) (Estonia)
Open Government Partnership
Open Society Foundation Bratislava (Slovakia)
Open Source Politics
Open Technologies Alliance – GFOSS
Ossigeno per l’Informazione
People in Need
People Powered (PP)
Political Parties of Finland for Democracy – Demo Finland
Portuguese Platform of Development NGOs
Raskrinkavanje (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SOLIDAR
TRAC FM International (Netherlands)
Transparency International EU
UG Zašto Ne (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Vouliwatch (Greece)
WHAT TO FIX
Global
African Digital Democracy Observatory (ADDO)
African Fact-Checking Alliance (AFCA)
Code for Africa (CfA)
Fundacion B77
HuMENA for Human Rights and Civic Engagement
One More Percent
The following organisations contributed to drafting this position: Alliance4Europe, ARTICLE 19, CFI Développement Médias (CFI), Civil Liberties Union for Europe, Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Democratic Society, European Centre for Press and Media Freedoms (ECPMF), European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), Europe Jacques Delors, European Partnership for Democracy, Free Press Unlimited (FPU), International Press Institute (IPI), Lie Detectors (LD), Make.org, Open Government Partnership.
The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) mandates Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) to conduct thorough assessments and implement mitigation measures for systemic risks that the use of their services pose, among others, to civic discourse and electoral processes (Articles 34 and 35).
The first risk assessment and mitigation measures reports for 2023 and 2024 have been made public in November 2024. This provides an opportunity for civil society and other experts to obtain more information on the measures adopted by VLOPs and VLOSEs and to be involved in improving the effectiveness of such measures in future reports.
This paper aims to analyse the risk assessments to identify relevant gaps and suggest steps on how to ensure more robust protection of civic discourse and electoral processes under the DSA. We will provide first a general analysis of the risk assessments and then focus on individual reports, namely those of Facebook, Instagram, Google Search, YouTube, TikTok, and X.
Today is the anniversary of the adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACEDG). On this important day for the African people, the European Partnership for Democracy reaffirms its commitment to engage with and empower African civil society for better governance and election integrity.
Why AHEAD Africa?
True democratic progress in Africa cannot be measured by elections alone, they are necessary, but not sufficient. It is in the moments between them that democracy is put to the test. Yet, the ecosystem in which elections are held partially pulls back the curtain on the democratic health of African countries. Over time, African civil society’s ability to monitor the dynamics of electoral settings has been clouded by the closing of civic space, political interference and intimidation. Refusal of accreditation or lack of clear accreditation processes, access to election-related data and polling stations by domestic observers’ has also proven to be amountain too high to climb. Added to this, the lack of continuous funding and the strain on the availability of internal resources leave these organisations running into a brick wall when it comes to designing and implementing effective interventions in the field of elections.
Empowering civil society to play a leading role in electoral processes fosters a virtuous cycle, where enhanced electoral integrity strengthens and solidifies democratic institutions across Africa. Through the AHEAD Africa project, EPD shares this goal, in line with the provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), where Article 22 echoes that a conducive environment should be guaranteed to allow for independent and impartial observation of electoral processes.
Building up a network for election integrity in Africa
Perfectly timed for the “super election” year, which saw over 19 elections across Africa, the AHEAD Africa initiative was launched at the outset of 2024.
Guided by the AHEAD methodology and aligned with the ACDEG’s mission, EPD works towards cementing effective political processes and building democratic institutions that stand the test of time in the African continent. In 2024, AHEAD Africa partners and its supported organisations deployed on the ground to support elections in South Africa,Mozambique, Namibia and Ghana.
EPD’s partner ESN-SA, and its secretariat ZESN, deployed citizen observers in South Africa during its 29 May elections.
EPD’s partners AfEONet and E-HORN at the 2024 EACSOF Summit held in Tanzania from 18 to 21 June 2024.
Participants at the Electoral Integrity Africa Summit I hosted by AfEONet in Uganda from 10 to 12 September 2024.
Our way forward
EPD and its project partner aim to foster an active role for citizen observers in electoral processes, collaborating with regional and continental institutions to ensure their inclusion, protect their status, and promote freer and fairer elections together in the different countries. Beyond the regional areas where the partners are based (Southern, East and West Africa), AHEAD Africa is engaging civil society and citizen observers from North and Central Africa in this endeavour, while engaging with the African Union and relevant organs along the way.
Where can you find AHEAD Africa?
Since yesterday, AHEAD Africa has also launched a comprehensive website where you will find all information about the project’s activities, the organisations supported, news, events and publications.
In 2024, European democracy support faced many geopolitical developments, including an unprecedented number of elections worldwide, a new wave of repressive legislation targeting civil society, and ongoing and intensified international conflicts.
While some regions showed promising signs of democratic resilience and renewal, much of the world faced a deepening democratic decline. Authoritarian regimes have grown increasingly skilled at adapting and employing new strategies, further undermining democratic systems and eroding people’s confidence, trust, and hope in the strength and future of democracy—both within their own countries and globally.
Year of elections
The year 2024 stood out as a historic year, with citizens in over 80 countries casting ballots. This cluster of elections was widely regarded as a critical test for global democracy, especially given the growing concerns about the rise of extremist parties, disinformation campaigns and the misuse of new technologies.
The impact of elections varied significantly across the world, but had little systemic impact, either positive or negative, in most countries. In some countries, elections led to shifts in political power, while in others, incumbent leaders held onto their positions. As many had feared, far-right parties gained support in states such as Austria, France, Germany, and Romania. At the same time, signs of democratic renewal emerged in a small number of countries like Botswana, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. However, allegations of electoral irregularities were observed in other countries, notably in Georgia, Mozambique and Venezuela.
Conflict and securitisation
Building on last year’s annual review emphasis on the challenges posed by rising conflict, 2024 witnessed a continuation and intensification of conflicts worldwide. These escalating dynamics compelled many governments to prioritise defence and security policies, often favouring security-focused approaches over broader democracy support initiatives. This shift has further highlighted the relative stagnation in the democracy support agenda. For instance, the new European Commission seems to concentrate more on defending democracy within Europe and less on supporting democracy around the world.
Meanwhile, under the guise of safeguarding national sovereignty and monitoring foreign interference, several governments adopted repressive legislation – often labelled as “foreign agents” laws. These measures have restricted the freedom of association, imposed burdensome financial reporting rules on Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and significantly threatened civic space.
European Democracy Support Annual Review 2024
Each year, the European Democracy Hub publishes a review of European democracy support policies. These reviews examine policies, strategies, and initiatives of the European Union (EU) as well as those of its member states and non-EU European countries active in democracy support such as Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The reviews provide insights into European efforts to defend and strengthen democracy both within Europe and around the world. This year marks the fourth edition of the review.
The European Democracy Support Annual Review is the flagship publication of the European Democracy Hub – a joint initiative of Carnegie Europe and the European Partnership for Democracy.
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