Over the past year, digital sovereignty has taken centre stage in European policy debates. Democratic-by-design governance of tech companies, however, has received far less attention. It deserves much more.
The current conversation about sovereignty remains, for the most part, narrowly focused on economics. Most recently, Germany and France have included digital sovereignty in their joint economicagenda. When it comes to emerging technologies, however, the economic dimension is only one piece of a much larger puzzle.
We can all agree that the technology sector has many problems. Since one of them is a clear democratic deficit, that’s our problem too. We citizens elect our representatives, yet ultimately, a few Big Tech corporations decide our collective destiny. Big Tech companies can choose to switch their services on and off for the general public and government institutions. They can determine whether, and how, they comply with laws enacted by democratically elected officials. They can even decide what information citizens do (or do not) have access to.
In the past few years, evidence showing that Big Tech companies pose a threat to democracy has only kept growing. The issues lie not only in specific practices such as weak data protection standards, amplification of disinformation, and election interference, but most importantly in their very structure. These corporations concentrate power not only in the market but also in how they govern themselves.
It is becoming ever clearer that this issue requires both attention and action. Ahead of the Franco-German Summit on European Digital Sovereignty, taking place this week in Berlin, the pressing question is what the European Union can (and should) do about it in the context of its digital sovereignty agenda.
On 12 November, the European Commission presented its long-awaited European Democracy Shield, representing the EU’s umbrella agenda for democracy support for the duration of this commission’s mandate.
EPD, along with 65 other organisations, has been actively engaged in the development of this initiative, focusing on the inclusion of our targeted recommendations in the proposal. While we warmly welcome the initiative, we agree with Commissioner McGrath’s statement at the dedicated press conference that the document presented is only a first step towards the protection and support of democracy across the European continent and will have to adapt to respond to a continually changing context.
The initiative is built on three pillars:
Safeguarding the integrity of the information space
Strengthening democratic institutions, free and fair elections, and free and independent media
Boosting societal resilience and citizens’ engagement
Finally, the document includes a detailed section on the commitment to funding for democracy support and the acknowledgement that additional efforts and support are needed on this front.
Broadly speaking, the European Democracy Shield includes the explicit acknowledgement of a significant majority of our recommendations, albeit with varying degrees of proposed follow-ups. Nevertheless, the current Shield represents a strong commitment by the European Commission to democracy support and marks a crucial first step towards concerted action in this field.
The European Partnership for Democracy will remain actively engaged with all of our members and partners to ensure that the Shield proposed today will indeed meet and exceed the goals it has set.
What follows is an overview of our recommendations and the extent to which the newly minted Shield has included them.
The European Partnership for Democracy community is glad to welcome MEMO 98.
MEMO 98 is based in Slovakia and is a specialist media monitoring organisation with extensive experience in delivering media analyses on behalf of international institutions and providing technical assistance to both official institutions and civil society groups.
In over 27 years, they have conducted numerous projects in Slovakia and in more than 60 other countries aimed at improving the media environment, strengthening critical thinking and helping citizens to receive comprehensive information.
Between 1999 to these days, MEMO 98 experts have also participated in more than 130 election observation missions in five continents, from the United States (West), through Iceland (North), Tanzania (South) to the Philippines (East).
“We are honoured to join the EPD community. At a time when elections and media are at the heart of the global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, we look forward to working with our partners to strengthen information integrity, civic engagement, and democratic resilience. Drawing on lessons from Central and Eastern Europe—where the fight for free media and fair elections has shaped our democratic journey—we aim to help build stronger, more resilient democratic societies.”
The 2024 global super election cycle put electoral integrity under unprecedented pressure. Across continents, rapid advances in digital technologies reshaped how campaigns were run, how information spread and how voters engaged. From AI-driven campaigns to disinformation and unregulated online advertising, rapid technological change exposed gaps in Europe’s electoral policy framework and around the world.
This report analyses global lessons from the 2024 elections and offers a forward-looking roadmap for EU policymakers. It highlights structural gaps—such as legal fragmentation, weak enforcement mechanisms and the unregulated use of emerging technologies—and proposes practical steps for policymakers to refine, strengthen and future-proof the union’s regulatory approach. Rather than focusing only on legislative fixes, the report calls for a coordinated and holistic strategy: robust law enforcement, complementary soft-law tools, and proactive offline interventions to strengthen and promote societal resilience.
International Democracy Day 2025 in Brussels offered both a sobering reality check and a source of renewed inspiration. Over two days of high-level panels and lightning talks, some 400 democracy activists, organisations, academics and politicians from around the world debated how to strengthen democracy at a time of crisis. Both the powerful democratic resilience stories from across the globe and the data on deepening democratic backsliding and widening inequalities were a reminder of citizens’ resilience and their tireless fight for freedom and dignity, and the continuous need to pursue our mission of support for democracy. Inspiring stories of democratic resilience from the world
International Democracy Day 2025 brought to Brussels some of the most inspiring stories of change and resilience, reminding us, the democracy support community, why our mission matters. Emma Theofelus, Namibia’s Minister of Information and Technology, shared her country’s progress. Since 2009, there have been new quotas for female MPs, helping Namibia’s parliament reach 40% gender parity. Equally striking, young people now hold 30% of seats.
Raša Nedeljkov, Programme Director at the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), recounted the extraordinary civic mobilisation in Serbia after the Novi Sad station canopy collapse. Students turned grief into a nationwide call for government accountability. Serbia shows that democracy does not survive on law alone—it needs people’s courage and aspirations for freedom.
Liudmyla Yankina, Co-Founder and Chairperson of Civis Fortis, described her NGO’s daily work to defend Ukrainian civil society and protect at-risk activists. She reminded us of the price many pay for speaking truth. VictoriaRoshchyna, a Ukrainian journalist imprisoned, tortured and ultimately killed by the Russian state, showed the world the reality of life under occupation. Thanks to her work, it is now a documented fact that Russia enlists children in the military.
What the data says
Yet these stories must not be romanticised. Across Africa, many women and young people still struggle to mobilise resources, facing mistrust, misogyny and exclusion. In Serbia and elsewhere, dissent is often met with batons. In Russia, countless journalists and activists remain imprisoned and tortured.
Kevin Casas Zamora, Secretary General of International IDEA, gave us a stark warning: the principle of democracy as equality of rights is under attack in two ways.
First, far-right narratives have normalised the rejection of equality promotion and diversity. Inclusive participation and the protection of minority rights are increasingly portrayed not as a strength of democracy, but as a perversion of it. As a democracy support community, we have a duty to counter this narrative.
Second, we are living in a time of profound inequality. This fuels growing discontent with democracy, which many feel is no longer delivering as promised. Today, the richest 1% own more wealth than 90% of humanity combined. Multinational corporations reward their CEOs with more money than they pay in taxes. These practices enshrine inequality and push democracy even further out of reach. The democracy support community must confront the deep sense of unfairness that follows.
There is a long way to go in ensuring meaningful youth political inclusion. Our recently launched Global Youth Participation Index found that there is still a widespread lack of information addressing young people on most government websites, and persistent systemic barriers to youth inclusion, political representation and leadership.
More generally, according to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Report 2025, declines in democracy are mainly concentrated in the areas of representation, human rights and the rule of law. Despite some notable advances — Brazil and Poland delivered democratic progress through electoral change — there have been global declines in electoral integrity, parliamentary effectiveness and press freedom. In the rule of law area, advances were registered only in the absence of corruption, with the most striking decline in performance registered in Europe.
Yet, beyond the numbers, citizens’ resilience offers hope. Civic movements have changed over the last decade, with an increase in social activism in the 2010s. Protests have been prominent, and not only do these movements use social media, but also wider online and offline tactics to spread their message. However, donors have struggled to adapt to these changes:civil society has become more fragmented and diverse. Part of the challenge for funders continues to be how to build bridges with new types of grassroots organisations.
Testimonies and data underline one essential truth: that supporting democracy is vital for future generations, and for a world where all share freedom.
What tools can we use right now?
With the first day devoted to case studies and experiences from the field, the second day of International Democracy Brussels moved on to look at the future of democracy support, and its role in Europe’s soft power, security and future vision.
With the United States stepping back from its traditional role in democracy support, the European Union must defend democratic values at home and abroad. While the US gap may not be filled financially, the EU can still lead by upholding its principles and continuing to work closely with the democracy support community.
Panellists outlined three key priorities:
Rethink support measures. Assistance must be designed carefully to avoid causing more harm than good. Flexibility is essential: facilitating quick responses along with small, urgent grants that help civil society organisations survive in times of crisis. Increasing grants to strengthen national civil society would help ensure that demand-driven initiatives and home-grown structures have agency and a core role to play.
Invest strategically through the next EU Budget.The upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034 is a crucial opportunity to mainstream democratic values across all policies. At a time when security agendas and hyper-militarisation are gaining ground, the EU must remember that democracy itself is the Union’s most valuable public good. Resilient democracies make the international environment safer and more peaceful.
Strengthen global partnerships. Democracy cannot survive in isolation. To succeed, it must be nurtured across borders, regardless of religion, colour, or gender. The EU and its partners must deepen cooperation, coordinate their actions, and present a united front against global threats.
Looking ahead
All of us in the EPD network are taking stock of the valuable lessons from these two days of exchange. Together with the entire European democracy support community, we will work to embed democracy across different European policies, strengthen inclusion, and ensure that all relevant actors have a seat at the table.
Democracy is not self-sustaining — it requires investment, solidarity, and courage, as voiced by all the passionate participants at this year’s International Democracy Day. The conversations in Brussels remind us that defending democracy is both a responsibility and an opportunity to secure rights, build resilience, and shape a more just and peaceful world.
International Democracy Day Brussels is organised every year thanks to the joint effort of Carnegie Europe, the European Network of Political Foundations (ENoP), the European Endowment for Democracy, the European Partnership for Democracy and International IDEA.
When the European Union first proposed a standalone Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA), expectations were high. Emerging in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and part of the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP), the initiative was meant to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to protecting democracy in the digital age and addressing specific risks to electoral integrity.
It was also meant to go further than both data protection rules contained in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and transparency rules in the Digital Services Act (DSA). Civil society organisations hoped it would mark a turning point, introducing strong safeguards on targeting and data use. Yet from the start, the proposal attracted criticism from all sides: too restrictive to be workable, too vague to be effective, and ultimately watered down into a compromise quickly concluded before the end of the legislative term.
As the Regulation enters into application on 10 October 2025, its prospects appear shaky. While a thorough consultation process has been conducted in the months leading up to its full application, it has been marked by a heavy presence of industry voices and limited participation from civil society and researchers. And yet it was the industry itself that eventually steppedout of the market to avoid compliance with the new rules, considered as not workable.
Mind the regulatory gaps
Much of the Regulation’s detail has been deferred to implementing acts and non-binding guidance documents. While the guidance offers welcome clarifications — notably on deadlines, the definition of political advertising, and the exclusion of private individuals’ opinions and media editorial content —, it was only published two days before the entry into application, and key areas such as the treatment of influencers and in-house advertising services remain under-defined, risking over-compliance by civil society or inconsistent enforcement.
The most serious blow to the Regulation’s relevance, however, comes from the reaction of the digital advertising industry itself. Major platforms such as Google and Meta have opted to withdraw from providing political advertising services in the EU, effectively leaving the Regulation without a meaningful field of application. If no one is offering regulated services, the new rules risk becoming largely symbolic, with little real-world impact in the best-case scenario and negative impact in the worst.
In fact, this withdrawal threatens to shrink the space for political speech online. Faced with legal uncertainty and the risk that content could be classified as political advertising under the Regulation’s broad definitions, platforms may increasingly choose to remove such content altogether. Combined with existing practices like the shadow-banning of political content, this could quickly turn online political debate into a thing of the past.
Yet political campaigning itself will not disappear; it will simply move elsewhere. Instead of transparent, regulated advertising, political campaigns are likely to become more opaque and harder to monitor, shifting offline or taking subtler forms through influencers, bots, or new, less visible tactics. In this scenario, the Regulation risks achieving the opposite of its original goal: reducing transparency instead of enhancing it.
Finally, the Regulation also foresees a review two years after the European elections. It remains unclear whether this timeline refers to 2026, given that the Regulation was already in force but not yet fully applicable before the 2024 elections. If so, that review should be seen as an opportunity to address the shortcomings highlighted above, rather than as a pretext to “simplify” the rules by rolling back the existing digital rights acquis.
Serious times call for serious measures
If the EU wants this Regulation to be taken seriously, it must first demonstrate that it takes it seriously itself, by addressing the main concerns highlighted above. For this reason, the European Commission should re-engage with diverse stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and election experts, to shape future revisions and ensure alignment with the EU’s broader obligations under the DSA to mitigate systemic risks to democratic processes.
The review of the Regulation could also be an opportunity to take a more encompassing approach which addresses not only transparency but also the underlying targeting and profiling practices that distort democratic discourse; and safeguard legitimate civic activities by ensuring that advocacy, fundraising, and issue-based campaigning by civil society organisations remain outside the Regulation’s scope when they do not pose risks to electoral integrity.
Online platforms on the other hand should re-examine the possibility of serving political advertising in the EU, especially ads that are not based on tracking and profiling, in a manner that is more conducive to civic discourse and electoral processes; and increase transparency around content distribution systems, particularly how engagement-based ranking affects the visibility of political and civic content and whether it systematically privileges polarising voices.
The EU’s Political Advertising Regulation was conceived as a flagship response to threats facing democratic discourse online. Yet without stronger enforcement, deeper reforms, and sustained political will, it risks fading into irrelevance, a missed opportunity to meaningfully reshape the digital political sphere, in the very moment where this is needed more than ever. As challenges around elections and political speech mount across Europe, the question is no longer whether such regulation is needed, but whether the EU will have the courage to take it seriously.
Across the globe, civic space is under pressure. Governments—whether authoritarian or democratic—are deploying legal, political, and judicial tools to curtail civil society organisations (CSOs), restrict protests, and silence dissent. This trend not only limits citizens’ ability to exercise fundamental rights but also erodes accountability and weakens democracy.
The European Union (EU) has recognised these threats, embedding support for civil society within its democracy and human rights agenda since The Roots of Democracy Communication (2012). Initiatives such as the European Democracy Shield, the Rule of Law toolbox, and the newly launched EU System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society (EU SEE) demonstrate growing ambition. Yet, the pressure on civic space continues to accelerate—demanding a more comprehensive, coherent, and resilient response.
Theforthcoming EU Civil Society Strategyoffers a crucial opportunity to consolidate this progress. To ensure that civil society can thrive as a watchdog, partner, and innovator, the EU must move beyond piecemeal support and mainstream civic space protection across all internal and external policies, while also supporting the wider enabling environment for civil society.
Why civil society matters
Civil society is indispensable for healthy democracies. It translates citizen concerns into policy debates, holds power to account, delivers services, and drives democratic innovation. When civil society actors are sidelined or threatened, democratic governance is hollowed out. The EU has invested in civic monitoring initiatives such as the Monitoring Action for Civic Space MACS, CSO Meter, and EU SEE. These efforts demonstrate that early detection of shrinking civic space enables proactive rather than reactive responses, reducing risks for CSOs and strengthening democratic resilience.
But information alone is not enough. CSOs need financial resources, supportive laws, political recognition, and safe digital and physical spaces. The EU needs to ensure that consultation of, and support to, civil society is fully integrated in all of its policies and in all stages of policymaking, from consultation and dialogue to partnership in implementation, to ensure policies are properly designed and carried out to maximise social impact. Without these, the accountability mechanisms they provide risk collapsing.
Six Principles for an Enabling Environment
Drawing from global practice and the EU SEE framework, six interdependent principles should guide the EU Civil Society Strategy:
Respect and protection of fundamental freedoms – Upholding freedom of expression, association, and assembly is the bedrock of open civic space. The EU should expand resources for independent media and establish mechanisms to protect human rights defenders against harassment and violence.
Supportive legal and regulatory frameworks — Member States must safeguard CSOs’ autonomy and operational freedom, avoiding restrictive laws such as “foreign agent” legislation. At the EU level, a cross-border law on associations could protect organisations working transnationally.
Accessible and sustainable resources — Funding cuts have left many organisations vulnerable. The EU should provide long-term, flexible, and equitable support through instruments like AgoraEU and Global Europe, while simplifying bureaucratic requirements and incentivising diverse funding sources, including philanthropy.
Open and responsive states — Transparent and inclusive policy dialogue strengthens democracy. The EU should issue guidelines for Member States on consulting CSOs and provide feedback loops, ensuring that civil society input shapes decision-making.
Supportive public culture and discourse — Civil society faces disinformation and delegitimisation campaigns. The EU and Member States must counter these narratives, amplify CSO success stories, and stand publicly with organisations under attack.
Access to a secure digital environment — With digital restrictions and cyberattacks on the rise, the EU should ensure CSOs can operate securely online. This includes access to digital tools, protection from censorship and disinformation, and promotion of an inclusive digital civic space.
Strengthening the EU’s policy architecture
For the Civil Society Strategy to be credible, it must be fully integrated with other EU frameworks, especially the European Democracy Shield and Rule of Law Mechanism. Civic space monitoring should inform policymaking, investment decisions, and political dialogues at the EU and Member State levels.
Concrete steps could include:
Institutionalising early warning mechanisms to flag civic space concerns alongside economic and rule of law indicators.
Linking EU funding conditionality to respect for civil society freedoms under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).
Embedding civic space assessments in the Global Gateway strategy and external action instruments, ensuring accountability and sustainability.
The role of democratic institutions
Civil society does not exist in isolation; it interacts daily with parliaments, political parties, judiciaries, and independent media. These actors can either enable or obstruct civic space. Unfortunately, in several contexts, democratic institutions themselves have been instrumental in shrinking space, passing restrictive laws, enabling strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), or amplifying anti-civil society narratives.
The EU should therefore:
Support legislative safeguards against SLAPPs and judicial harassment.
Encourage parliaments to engage with CSOs in drafting laws that affect vulnerable groups.
Promote independent, non-profit media as allies in transparency and accountability.
Through financial incentives and conditionality, the EU can help align democratic institutions with civic space protection, both inside and outside its borders.
Civil society in EU external action
Externally, civil society support is not only a values-driven commitment but also a strategic necessity. CSOs contribute to accountability in development projects, strengthen governance, and prevent elite capture of resources. The Global Gateway, the EU’s flagship external investment strategy, illustrates this point. By mainstreaming civil society consultations and integrating civic space assessments into country roadmaps, the EU can ensure that projects in areas such as infrastructure, climate, and digitalisation reflect community needs and generate sustainable impact.
To achieve this, the EU should:
Require partner governments to commit to open civic space as part of Global Gateway agreements.
Involve CSOs systematically in the design, monitoring, and evaluation of projects.
Protect international solidarity by resisting restrictive foreign fundinglaws and supporting cross-border cooperation.
Civil society is not a peripheral actor but a cornerstone of democratic resilience. As civic space closes worldwide, the EU faces a defining test of its democratic credibility. The forthcoming Civil Society Strategy can equip Europe with the tools to defend and expand civic space, provided it embraces coherence, invests in sustainability, and mainstreams civil society engagement across all policies.
By protecting the environment in which civil society operates, the EU will not only uphold its own values but also reinforce democracy globally, ensuring that citizens everywhere have the space to organise, speak out, and shape their societies.
The recently published EU Code of Practice on General-Purpose AI (GPAI) offers little clarification or additional guidance on preventing and mitigating AI risks for electoral processes.
While we welcome the explicit reference to “democratic processes” and “harmful manipulation” in the final version of the Code as an essential starting point, the current framing remains too vague to capture the depth and complexity of risks that GPAI poses to democracy, particularly regarding the following areas:
1. Specification of democracy-related risks: the language used remains abstract and lacks actionable clarity. To ensure meaningful risk mitigation, the taxonomy should identify concrete threats that GPAI systems pose to democratic processes, particularly elections.
2. Strengthening mitigation measures: the GPAI CoP currently under-specifies mitigation measures tailored to democratic contexts.
4. Civil society marginalisation: While the EU’s stated goal for the drafting of the Code of Practice was to include various stakeholders, the actual process fell short-particularly with regard to civil society participation.Only 11% of participants represented civil society organisations, while nearly half were from industry.
5. Effective enforcement mechanisms: The fact that major actors like Meta can opt out of the Code without consequence further reinforces the need for binding legal frameworks to ensure consistent compliance and protect the public interest. In a democratic system like the EU, soft law should serve as a complement, not a substitute for enforceable regulation.
The EU Code of Practice on General-Purpose AI is a voluntary framework developed by the European Commission in collaboration with industry, civil society, and other stakeholders to promote the responsible development and deployment of general-purpose AI systems. The Code aims to establish common principles and risk mitigation measures for GPAI models, particularly in areas where their use may pose systemic societal risks, including to democratic processes. It is designed to complement the implementation of the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), the EU’s new legal framework for AI, which entered into force in August 2024.
The European Partnership for Democracy joined a global coalition of organisational leaders and justice advocates in an urgent call to action to reverse the worldwide decline in the Rule of Law, marked by the release of the Warsaw Principles at the conclusion of the 2025 World Justice Forum in Warsaw on 26 June. The Forum reunited prominent international figures to address the most pressing challenges to justice and human rights. The Warsaw Principles represent a unified front against rising authoritarian pressures and a framework for collective action to strengthen accountability.
The announcement comes at a critical time, as the World Justice Project (WJP) reports that the Rule of Law has deteriorated in 77% of countries over the past decade. The Warsaw Principles create a common agenda for the diverse array of organisations working to counter this trend.
“The Warsaw Principles are not an abstract declaration. They are a call to action,” stated Alejandro Ponce, Executive Director of the World Justice Project, the Forum’s organiser. “Reversing the Rule of Law recession requires stronger connections, better alignment, and deeper cooperation across sectors and borders. This, in essence, is what the rule of law accountability ecosystem demands and what our shared agenda now seeks to deliver”.
The 10 Warsaw Principles call for:
Safeguarding institutional checks and balances
Ensuring peaceful transfers of power
Protecting civic space and fundamental rights
Strengthening judicial independence
Eliminating corruption
Advancing people-centered justice
Securing lawyers’ safety
Integrating the Rule of Law in sustainability, technology, and development
The World Justice Project announced that the Warsaw Principles are now open for endorsement by organisations worldwide, inviting them to join the growing community committed to collaborative action.
If there were a word to describe the current political climate, it would be ‘change’: technological, geopolitical and socio-economic. The status quo is over, and politics is struggling to adapt. Democratic principles have been going through a stress test in the last decade. This has seen a weakening of state institutions, the criminalisation of dissent, the use of violence, threat and terror, a rise in the spread of misinformation, a comeback of charismatic authority and the cult of the leader, and an undermining of the rule of law.
It is against this background that the EPD Annual Conference 2025 gathered some of the most insightful minds on democracy and politics to take stock of the lessons learned from the past and gather ideas for rebooting democracy support together. Here are our main takeaways from the day.
Europe in flux
The Conference looked at three things that democracy supporters will closely monitor in the upcoming months: what the EU will do to create a more pro-democratic digital space, how Europe will protect democracy through the upcoming European Democracy Shield and the space for democracy in the upcoming EU Budget.
The impact of the digital sphere on democracy goes beyond election campaigns, it spans our everyday life as the top source of information and the main vehicle of disinformation and misinformation. The EU has the tools to deal with this via a set of regulations and laws but lacks a competitive digital sector to build new tools. Human rights principles and data protection were already integrated into digital policy with the GDPR in 2018, and key digital policy files such as the Digital Services Act, the AI Act and the Regulation on Political Advertising. These tools are the EU’s opportunity to ensure that the European digital space is truly democratic and free, allowing citizens to really choose the content they want to access and consume.
The new European Democracy Shield is designed to address some of the threats to democracy both online and offline, such as attacks on civic space, election integrity and media freedom. Following the money here is crucial. More capital needs to be shifted towards funding efforts addressing these threats. For a truly effective shield for democracy, this would be the first step to help ensure election integrity, safe election campaigns, transparency from big tech, a safe and enabling environment for journalists and civil society.
While investing capital is vital, defence and strategic external policy priorities cannot come at the expense of support for the values on which European politics is based. The situation outlined by the activists invited to share their stories (see below) at our conference is a clear demonstration of that. The EU budget represents only a minimum part of EU Member States’ budgets and cannot in any way substitute national budget efforts but it is a key tool for supporting European interests.
The political will to defend democracy as the most important value for the EU, internally and externally, will be crucial in the discussions ahead of the 2028-2034 framework. Right now, the dominant narrative is putting the EU’s interests first – given the global crises – and giving a big priority to competitiveness and defence. Yet, democracy is a vital interest for Europe: it supports economic growth, security and peace and must be prioritised as such. The time for pressure is now; the political will needs to come now.
The world in flux
In the last decade, people have protested more than at any other point in human history, in ways that were spontaneous, leaderless, digitally coordinated, and horizontally constructed. However, while this recipe has proven effective at getting people onto the streets, a democratic happy ending is not automatic.
The Annual Conference brought to Brussels three democracy activists from Georgia, Serbia and Cuba, currently representing three among the most ignited contexts where people are demanding change. In Georgia, Mariam Kaulashvili-Southwell led a movement of over 200,000 members protesting against the foreign agent law, continuing to inspire resistance, despite severe repression targeting opposition leaders, journalists and civil society. Milica Kostin is among the Serbians who are protesting to demand government accountability in the aftermath of the Novi Sad station canopy collapse in November 2024, participating in a movement that has created solidarity between Serbian people no matter how they identify religiously or nationally. Victor Dueñas explained how Cuba is an example of a place where civic space is not just restricted but also criminalised, even with long prison sentences now supported by a new penal code.
Our conference made clear that much remains to be done to ensure that everyone is brought to the table in decision-making across politics and policy space. Women’s political representation in national parliaments rose from 11 per cent in 1995 to over 27.2 per cent, but systematic barriers to women’s political inclusion are still obvious. This is particularly apparent when it comes to increased violence and intimidation – with our guests underscoring that aggression has become more prominent in politics in recent years particularly as gender issues are used in so called ‘culture-wars’.
In light of these constant changes, how should we re-imagine democracy support, and what are the opportunities to look out for? If there is another word that can go hand in hand with change, it would be “flexibility”. The response to such changes should not be about defending everything in the current system, but rather changing it, building shared infrastructure, building bridges to make policy participatory and doing more on the ground to collect knowledge.
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