The European Union increasingly sees itself in direct competition with global powers such as China for global influence and access to natural resources. The launch of the Global Gateway initiative in 2021 is widely viewed as a response to weakened multilateral cooperation, while the strongest economies increasingly prioritise their own interests. China’s flagship global development programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can be seen as an example of this development.
However, as Western aid recedes—with the United States winding down USAID and Europe shifting funds from development to defence—China is rapidly filling the donor vacuum with an evolving, alternative development model.
Moving away from large, state-led lending, Beijing is now focusing more on commercially-oriented infrastructure financing and blended-finance models. Meanwhile, European donors are increasing large-scale, visible infrastructure projects while scaling back investment in their traditional areas of strength and reputation: civil society, good governance, and democratic institutions.
A new Deep Dive by the European Democracy Hub, in collaboration with Demo Finland, examines China’s rising influence across four key areas:
- Development financing – Funding through the Belt and Road Initiative has far exceeded Europe’s official development assistance (ODA). It is often geared towards advancing diplomatic and geostrategic goals and raises concerns about dependency risks in the Global South.
- Party diplomacy – China’s party diplomacy has become a crucial component of its foreign policy. The Chinese Communist Party engages with foreign political parties through high-level bilateral meetings, study tours to China, regional forums, and party schools to advance its core policy interests: isolating Taiwan, promoting alternative global narratives about China, and promoting its political system.
- Media development – China invests billions annually in the Global South to build media infrastructure, partner with local outlets, and train journalists in ways that promote pro-China narratives. Western aid cuts have left local media outlets financially exposed, allowing China to deepen its influence.
- Digital technology cooperation – For years, Chinese firms have exported surveillance technologies that can tighten state control and restrict civic freedoms. These exports are driven by the Chinese Communist Party’s ambitions, while strong demand from authoritarian and hybrid regimes accelerates their spread.
The report finds that China adapts its cooperation to different contexts, often reinforcing existing power structures and dynamics, which in some cases means emboldening authoritarian forces. Taken together, these findings suggest that China’s development cooperation across the four thematic areas warrants closer scrutiny from European donors.
This publication was produced by the European Democracy Hub in collaboration with Demo Finland.
The European Democracy Hub is a joint initiative of the European Partnership for Democracy and Carnegie Europe.
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