



Democracy support in dominant party states

The case of Mozambique





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Introduction

After a protracted and intensely violent civil war between RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) and the FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozambique) government that lasted 16 years, a new Constitution was drafted in 1990 which introduced multiparty democracy in Mozambique. Since the 1990 constitutional changes, democratic elections have been considered the only way to gain political power in Mozambique.

The AGP (General Peace Agreement), agreed upon following the civil war, stipulated that participation in the political transition from a one-party state to a multiparty democracy would be restricted to the government and RENAMO, as the electoral legal framework adopted at that time was dominated by these two negotiating parties.¹ Emergent small parties were excluded from drafting the first electoral legislation and, unfortunately, their lack of participation in electoral drafting remained until the most recent set of elections that took place in 2019 under new electoral legislation², which were approved shortly before these elections.

The AGP was adopted as part of the country's law in 1992. Some of the key elements, which made up the first electoral law – for example, the electoral system, based on proportional representation and the 5% threshold – derived from the AGP. Electoral legislation has often been revised to prevent and avoid a conflict between FRELIMO forces and RENAMO's armed members, and it has been adjusted to accommodate new trends introduced by political dynamics in every electoral period.

The Constitution of the country provides for an executive President of the Republic who is elected directly in general elections, by a simple majority, with a possibility for a

second round of elections. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority, a run-off between the two candidates who have received the highest number of votes in the first round is held. No runoff has thus far been necessary, as the 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019 elections were won by the FRELIMO Presidential candidates with an absolute majority of the total valid votes. The President serves a five-year term, renewable for one term only.³

In our view, electoral and political party legislation play an important role in upholding the dominance of FRELIMO. These reforms paved the way for “democratisation from above”, which has continued ever since and contributes to the weakness of political parties, stakeholders, mass media and civil society. This paper first examines different areas of the dominant party system before discussing democracy support efforts in the country and offering some conclusions and recommendations for future support.

1 Terenciano, F. (2017): “Comparative Analysis of Political Competition effectiveness in Brazil and in Mozambique (1990-2014)”. *Brazilian Journal of African Studies*, 2(4), pp. 93-110.

2 See Preamble of the Law n. 2/2019 of 31st May – which introduced a new legal framework to elect the President of the Republic and the Members of the Parliament, after consensus was achieved on the dialogue between the FRELIMO Government and RENAMO.

3 That has been the case since the 2004 constitutional amendment. As per the 1990 Constitution, the presidential term could be renewed twice.

The dominant party system in Mozambique

This section analyses to what extent political parties, non-state actors, elections bodies and the Parliament can influence policymaking and the institutional framework within which elections are held in Mozambique. We try to illustrate how FRELIMO's party discipline affects the availability of windows of opportunity in the policy process and directly influences the room for manoeuvre for the opposition.

Political Parties

The multiparty landscape today includes about 100 registered political parties, with around 74 of them considered to be active. Regardless of the number of parties that have contested elections or are currently registered, only FRELIMO and RENAMO have dominated the political arena in Mozambique, with the former consistently holding a majority of the seats in parliament. The MDM (Mozambique Democratic Movement) entered the Mozambican political arena in 2009 and it is the third political force in the country.

In terms of the structure of the party system, Mozambique presents an almost closed party system, since not all elements that characterise closed systems can be identified in the Mozambique context. Having taken the initiative to end its own one-party rule by promoting the transition to democracy through the 1990 constitutional reform, before the end of the civil war, the FRELIMO government gained a privileged constitutional position in relation to RENAMO. It has remained in power throughout 30 years of democratic transition and beyond.

In our view and accepting Nuvunga and Salih's approach ,

this came about because transition occurred without breaking the shackles of the old regime. Therefore, generally speaking, the traits and patterns exhibited by political institutions are mirror images of the avenues chosen in the past (path dependency), particularly the timing and modality of democratic transition. The implication is that the dynamics, traits, and "incentive structures" exhibited by electoral governance institutions not only mirror the broader context of FRELIMO's dominance over political institutions, but also reflect the path chosen at the time of institutional design that led to the democracy-founding elections in 1994.

The politics and the context underpinning electoral institutions at the time of the first set of multiparty elections has played an important part in setting the path that currently impacts the incentive structures of electoral institutions. As electoral laws stand, electoral institutions are functionally independent from the party in government, but the incentive structures that motivate such institutions are more responsive to FRELIMO interests than to the principles of democratic governance. It has been pointed out that CNE (National Electoral Commission) members and STAE (Technical Secretary for Election Administration) officials tend to compromise electoral transparency (in the way they organise the electoral census, choose members of the brigades for the census within communities, manoeuvre and manipulate data in the polls during the voting and counting process, etc) in order to serve the interests of FRELIMO, not only in the hope of some reward but also by their conviction that no disciplinary action for any misconduct will be taken against them.

While this study does not suggest that FRELIMO as a

4 See Nuvunga, A. & Mohamed Salih, M.A. (2013): "Party dominance and electoral institutions: framing Frelimo's dominance in the context of an electoral governance deficit". *Africa Review*, 5(1), pp. 23-42, DOI: 10.1080/09744053.2013.832065

party has benefited from all of these actions, from 1999 until the 2019 general elections, both “human error” (manoeuvres as exemplified and illustrated above) and deliberate action taken by the CNE and STAE have been prejudicial towards the opposition, hampering their ability to compete for power through the ballot box. Therefore, it is evident that electoral and political party legislation play an important role in upholding the status quo.

Civil Society

Civil society emerged to combat the erosion of democracy after FRELIMO started to control religious and mass group gatherings as the gap between different social classes and values widened. Civil society can be broadly defined as based on principles and values such as solidarity, social justice, participation, and is made up of organisations that aim to develop strategic actions for participatory democratic processes and social change.

In recent years there have been some rather high-profile failures by domestic democracy support organisations to get registered in Mozambique or cases in which their national registration was withdrawn. It shows how sensitive it is to operate in Mozambique as a democracy support organisation. The ruling party is more concerned about NGO interference in politics and NGOs’ financial ability to develop their scope of work than they are about their governmental counterparts’ ability to do so. New legislation, in preparation at the Parliament, aims to control civil society by enforcing registration criteria that will only enable a few NGOs to operate. The current legislation for associations (such as civil society organisations) is rather soft and includes legal criteria that allow more NGOs to be registered and operate in the country. Once a year, these NGOs must compile a report of their activities to be sent to the government or ministry related to their activities. For example, if the organisation operates in the educational field, it must report, at least, annually to the Ministry of Education and Human Development.

The newly proposed legislation, which is now in the committee stage will probably aggravate the situation and indicate more state control. For example, this legislation implies double subordination to the responsible Ministry of the NGO’s particular sector and to the Ministry of Justice. If the NGO fails to report annually, they can be prohibited from operating in the country by administrative orders of the relevant government body. Aware of the reality in Mozambique, most NGOs’ concerns are related to their capability to survive in this new arena. With the lack of capabilities and financial resources to produce their reports on time, some civil society members fear that this is a state mechanism deployed to avoid the “noisy” presence of those organisations in the political and democracy field. Current electoral legislation allows for wide participation of civil society in the electoral process, including in the composition of bodies like the CNE and the STAE. The CNE consists of 13 commissioners, five of whom are nominated by Political Parties represented in Parliament (FRELIMO, RENAMO and MDM) and the remaining eight members are nominated from legally registered civil society organisations but selected by the five political party appointees.

Mass Media

The 1990 Constitution enshrined citizens’ right to political participation, freedom of speech, and the right to information among other rights. A number of free media outlets criticise corrupt politicians and practices, promoting a strong culture of rule of law and social activism towards open participation in the decision-making process. There is legally free press and freedom of speech. However, some official newspapers and national television channels are controlled by leaders or CEOs appointed by the dominant party, FRELIMO.

However, severe constraints, attacks on journalists, a lack of resources, and self-censorship complete a bleak picture for Mozambique’s media environment.

5 Guided by the need to ensure citizens’ right to political participation in matters of governance, the Constitution defines political pluralism as the guiding principle of Mozambique’s democracy.

Despite this, there are now a number of free media and private television channels, which work without being intimidated or abused by the dominant parties. The constant restrictions on the work of opposition politicians, academics and writers show the low level of openness within Mozambique to a culture of dialogue and the peaceful coexistence of ideas. Even outside the restrictions on professional politicians, citizens can see that spaces for exercising their opinions and political freedoms have been increasingly restricted and threatened.

Elections and Parliament

The first past-the-post (FPTP) system was initially proposed as the country's electoral system in the early 1990s. This was done in order to give the country an unfragmented parliament combined with a cohesive and strong executive able to embark upon the daunting task of remaking the nation and allowing the country to rise from the ashes of war.

RENAMO questioned this option and proposed proportional representation (PR), arguing that FRELIMO had chosen the FPTP electoral system to facilitate their victory. This argument was also supported by the other emerging and unarmed political parties. With the closed-party-list PR system adopted, it was expected that a large number of political parties would be represented in Parliament. However, the introduction of an electoral threshold of five per cent of the national vote ultimately created a two-party system. Most of the smaller parties and CSOs blamed the two largest parties for creating an unrepresentative and bipolar parliament.

Since the introduction of multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, Mozambique has adopted a proportional representation system with closed party lists for the election of MPs. Parliamentary representation of each party is calculated using the d'Hondt method for converting votes. To this day, the d'Hondt method prevails, creating obstacles for most parties to reach the required threshold to gain parliamentary representation. According to some authors, if that method were to be abolished, the proportion of votes achieved by small parties would enable them to gain representation in Parliament.

Each political party or party coalition can run with a list of names for each of the eleven provincial constituencies, including the capital Maputo. From 2004 two seats were reserved for the Diaspora constituencies. Candidates cannot stand simultaneously on the list of more than one political party or party alliance and cannot stand for their own political party or alliance in more than one constituency. The electoral system does not provide any opportunity for individual candidates to run outside the political party or coalition lists, although this does not prevent political parties from including independent candidates in their lists.

Within the Parliament, party discipline, especially within the context of FRELIMO dominance, results in MPs receiving party orders/instructions which they must follow at all costs and by any means. These mandatory internal party rules are injunctive for their members and close windows of opportunity in the policy process, as seen in the *Caso das Dividas Ocultas* or during debates of electoral legislation in the CNE or the STAE.

6 It is important, however, to note that as per the electoral results, RENAMO could have won majority in parliament if the FPTP system had been kept with the provinces as the multinominal districts. Having won majorities in Tete, Manica, Sofala, Zambézia e Nampula, RENAMO could have won 152 seats instead of 112 that they had. On the other hand, FRELIMO could have won just 98 seats, instead of the 129 they did, and UD could not have made it to the Parliament.

7 Mulhovo, H. (2018): "The intricacies and pitfalls of the politics of coalition in Mozambique". In ACCORD (2018): Complexities of Coalition Politics in Southern Africa - Monograph Series No. 1/2018. Available [here](#).

8 Instituto de Democracia Multipartidária (2017), Base de dados dos Partidos Políticos moçambicanos, Maputo.

9 As perceived during debates in Parliament related to this huge economic fraud, FRELIMO MPs received party orders to approve the illegal Government Budget Report (Conta Geral do Estado). After the scandal was revealed, in 2019 the Constitutional Council of Mozambique ruled against that Act because it offended the Constitutional Provisions of Mozambique and said the *Dividas Ocultas* were illegal and not valid. See Acórdão n. 5/CC/2019, de 3 de Junho do Conselho Constitucional de Moçambique, exarado nos autos do Processo n. 6/CC/2017 e Incorporado Processo n. 8/CC/2017 – Fiscalização sucessiva abstracta da Constitucionalidade.




FIGURE 1: Proportion of women in different political positions in Mozambique as of 2021.

Women's political representation

In regard to the role of women in Mozambique's political life, there has been rapid progress made in their political representation. For example, there was an increase from 37 to 42 percent of female MPs from the previous term to the current term, 2020-24, as a result of the 2019 general elections in Mozambique. At the moment, the Presidency of the Parliament, the General Prosecutor's Office, the Constitutional Council, the Ministry of Justice, and the Administrative Court are all presided over by women. In the government, if we consider only the ministers, excluding the prime-minister and the president, there are 10 women (47) out of a total of 21. In the recently created position of provincial secretary, initially 6 women (55%) were appointed out of a possible 11.

The following sections analyse democracy support, highlighting media support, civil society support, and programs aimed at strengthening the judiciary in Mozambique.

10 See [here](#) for more details.

11 The position was created through the 2018 constitutional amendment, with the first appointment taking place in 2020.

Assessing democracy support in Mozambique

Democracy support in Mozambique began in the early 1990s as one part of the intensive international, UN-coordinated assistance to political party development to help end the country's extremely long, destructive civil war. As part of the conflict resolution process, the aid consisted primarily of large amounts of direct cash infusions into the parties, different from international party aid in most other contexts. As Mozambique's political life moved toward more normalised multiparty competition, the external party aid normalised as well.

In 1992, after the signing of the General Peace Accords between FRELIMO, the governing party, and RENAMO, RENAMO's leader, Afonso Dhlakama, requested between 10 million and 12 million USD of party aid from the United Nations. He argued that the sum was necessary to enable the transformation of RENAMO from a guerrilla movement to a political party capable of competing in the elections that would seal the Peace Accords.

In December of that year, RENAMO signed an agreement with FRELIMO according to which RENAMO would receive 15 million USD from the UN - while all the other opposition parties would receive 17 million USD from then until the elections held in 1994. RENAMO periodically received substantial injections of UN funding, while continually complaining that the Western governments involved in the peace process were not living up to their promises and threatening to pull out of the election if it did not get what it was promised. The UN also established a separate fund to support other new parties: although smaller than RENAMO's, this was useful to these many fledgling groups.

The next set of national elections, held in 1999, saw a repeat, albeit on a smaller scale, of the international support for Mozambique's parties. Although the peace process was advancing reasonably well, there were still fears about the solidity of the political consensus over the

electoral process, and an inclination to use party aid to preserve achievements. Under Mozambique's electoral law, the government is supposed to create a fund to support the parties' electoral campaigns. In the year before the 1999 elections, some Western governments would fail to fulfil their obligation, either due to a shortage of funds or reluctance to do anything that would help RENAMO. USAID and some European donors decided to help underwrite the fund and contributed most of what would eventually become a 1.4 million USD fund. The money was distributed to FRELIMO, RENAMO, and the main smaller parties according to a formula agreed upon by the parties. For the much better-funded FRELIMO the fund was less significant.

As part of the normalisation process, more conventional Western party aid (modest amounts of training and technical assistance rather than cash transfers) got underway around the 1999 elections. FRELIMO had previously received some such support from some European centre-left parties and party foundations, including the Portuguese Socialist Party and the Ebert Stiftung.

In 1999, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) initiated what became a five-year party building programme primarily directed at FRELIMO and RENAMO. USAID funded the programme in the hope that would help RENAMO begin to play a more effective role as an opposition party and that a multiparty program would improve communication between FRELIMO and RENAMO, thereby reducing the frequent unproductive standoffs between them.

The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) started work in Mozambique soon after, helping to organise some multiparty dialogue activities and offering grants to all registered parties for training

or other organisational developments activities. The European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), as a group of European parliamentarians that engaged in party work in South Africa in the 1990s, began offering training programs to parties on a multiparty basis.

In addition to those multiparty efforts, some European party groups established party-to-party assistance programs along ideological lines. The left-right ideological divide was present enough in Mozambique to allow European foundations to pursue the peer-to-peer party method more easily than in many other parts of Africa. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the British Conservative Party provided technical support to RENAMO whilst the Friedrich Ebert Foundation did the same for FRELIMO. By the middle of the 2000s the party aid scene in Mozambique was moderately active, although it was only a small part of the very large and growing donor commitment to the country.

One of the interesting developments with regard to the 2009 and all subsequent parliamentary elections is that the 5% electoral threshold no longer applies following a reform of electoral law. Mozambican law also does not proscribe floor-crossing in parliament. It also allows contenders in elections to use loudhailers without any need for authorisation by administrative authorities.

In Mozambique there are two indirect forms of public support to parties and campaigns: free space for advertisement on public radio and television, and tax exemptions. Media space is allocated equally to each party, and parties with presidential candidates each receive five minutes of airtime per day, as do parties with legislative candidates. Unlike direct financial support, the number of candidates nominated by each party does

not affect equity, and even small parties who run in only a few constituencies receive equal space on radio and television. However, free media airtime is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, free access to media advertisements is an important resource. On the other hand, the making of television and radio advertisements is very expensive. Only FRELIMO, RENAMO, and PDD were able to produce quality television spots (as seen in 2009 elections). Both FRELIMO and RENAMO hired professional services to produce pieces and update them daily.

For example, 21 days after the start of the 2019 electoral campaign, a platform of electoral observation reported that from a total of 4 political parties who had a residential candidate, one (AMUSI) had not delivered television radio spots to Radio Moçambique. Additionally, from a total of 26 parties who ran for legislative elections, 13 (50%) had not delivered the spots to the radio.

Funding of political parties

A. Public funding

Parties receive annual public funding and additional funds during an election year . For example, a total of 180 million meticais (more than \$3 million) was allocated to political parties for electoral campaign funding. Although the law obliges political parties to account for how they use state campaign funds, experience shows that they have refrained from doing so. Moreover, the sanctions provided for by law, as a result of non-compliance with this legal obligation, are also not applied .

The total amount of public resources for the 2004

12 The only one, among the four parties, which did not (and still does not) have parliamentary seats.

13 Details on this are found in Sala da Paz (2019)'s observation report, Informe Sobre a Avaliação Intermédia Campanha Eleitoral 2019 26 Dias, available [here](#).

14 See the Law n. 02/2019 for more details on political parties' electoral campaign funding, available [here](#).

15 A research report by CIP (2019) (available [here](#)) provides more details on this.

elections was \$2.2 million from a combined source of international donors and the Mozambique government's national budget. Political parties are compelled by law to report every year on party accounts, including detailed information on funding sources and disbursements but no sanctions are provided in the event of illegal funding. Another variant of indirect public support is tax exemption. One argument to justify this special treatment lies in the not-for-profit character of party organisations. Another is that taxation and oversight activities could eventually result in undue control of political organisations. Tax exemption is meant to preclude parties from this kind of control.

In 2019 FRELIMO was by far the best equipped in terms of campaign resources: new trucks and minibuses were used all over the country. Supporters showed up with T-shirts, caps, flags and capulanas. Some state activities overlapped with the campaign of FRELIMO. The use of state-owned transportation for campaign activities was observed in several provinces. On a daily basis, state vehicles from the local administration (of health/agriculture) were used to drive FRELIMO activists.

It is understandable that there is always financial support provided, mainly to political parties represented in the Parliament and others out of it, to ensure that peace is sustained in Mozambique. An example is the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) Agreement signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO to stop war in the Provinces of Sofala and Manica.

We can say that the objectives of democracy support throughout the years have never changed. The DDR Process is a clear example that projects continued to be aimed at maintaining peace, keeping RENAMO and FRELIMO happy and with the political status quo and not moving to make politics more inclusive and open to a more representative system.

B. Donor Support

On the top of the public funding, the Political Party Act (Law n. 7/91, of 23 January, amended by Law n. 14/92, de 14 October, article 14, al. h) combined with article 17, al. b) - provides donations from private entities as additional sources of funding's for political parties in Mozambique. In fact, through this line political parties get important support from international partners. The list of international partners ranges from NGOs, foundations, sister parties and embassies.

The most common support comes from NGOs working in democracy support, among which the most visible along the years have been NIMD, NDI, IRI, IMD and EISA. Among foundations, the most relevant have been German foundations Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; and Swedish Foundation Olof Palme.

The support received from sister parties although considered important is not expressed monetarily. It is mostly based on learning exchanges and campaign support through equipment and campaigning materials. Most support comes from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and European party organisations. From the SADC region, the liberation parties tend to form blocks supporting FRELIMO, while the opposition parties from the region tend to liaise with the likeminded Mozambican opposition, be it in a less well organised and systematic way. Concerning European party support, left-wing parties tend to support FRELIMO while right wing parties tend to support the opposition.

It is important to note that there is a difference from the funding approach used by the NGOs and Foundations. The NGOs tend to use multilateral support while foundation use bilateral support. On the multilateral approach, NGOs give support to the parties represented in the parliament using the equity principle. On the bilateral support, some foundations only support the ruling party, while others support only the opposition parties.

The support from embassies, although not very evident, has played a critical role. This support has been given by a small number of embassies and has not been offered in a systematic way. Most of the support is done through intermediary organisations and goes to specific thematic areas of democracy such as election support.

Finally, the key areas of party support have been elections, capacity building and the democracy reform agenda and multiparty dialogue. Up to now, it has been difficult to estimate the amount of funds going to political parties because of resistance or lack of political will of the parties to disclose their sources. In the case of the ruling party, according to some interviewees, the lack of interest may be due to the undue use of public funds; while in the case of the opposition, the reason associated is their donors' fear of intimidation.

The EU, OAS, UNDP, and other multilateral organisations have dedicated efforts to help build strong democratic institutions such as the Parliament, the judiciary, the Ombudsman Office, the Mozambique Bar Association, and civil society. However, they are weak because the political system was designed to benefit FRELIMO, cement the status quo, keep RENAMO as the main opposition party, and not to help create a more level playing field for the other political actors.

Conclusion and recommendations

In our view, electoral and political party legislation play a vital role in upholding the dominance of FRELIMO. Reforms after the civil war paved the way for “democratisation from above”, which has continued ever since and contributed to the weakness of political parties, stakeholders, mass media and civil society.

In the Mozambican context, democratisation through constitutional reform and a process of democratisation from above not only marked the trajectory of political institutions emerging from this process (which form the foundations of the Second Republic), but also opened the path to a greater and ever-increasing proximity between national politics and a dominant FRELIMO party. This came because transition occurred without breaking the shackles of the old regime.

Therefore, generally speaking, the traits and patterns exhibited by political institutions are mirror images of the avenues chosen in the past, particularly the timing and modality of democratic transition. The implication of this path dependency is that the dynamics, traits, and “incentive structures” exhibited by electoral governance institutions not only mirror the broader context of FRELIMO’s dominance over political institutions, but also reflect the path chosen at the time of institutional design that led to the democracy-founding elections in 1994.

While this study does not suggest that FRELIMO, as a party, has benefited from all these actions, it has to conclude that, unfortunately, since 1999 until the 2019 general elections, both human error and deliberate action by these institutions have been prejudicial to the ability of the opposition to compete for power through the ballot box. It presented evidence that electoral and political party legislation play an important role in upholding the status quo.

In view of the dominant party system, some of the most effective reforms in the country since independence have been the change to a multiparty democracy, the formal separation of powers, and the role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law. The growing consciousness people have regarding their rights and the participation of citizens at the decision-making table have also been important. At the same time, the participation of women in the Parliament, the executive and the judiciary in top positions shows a commitment on gender issues, and this has promoted equality of opportunity in recent years. Generally speaking, the fact that peace has endured should also be regarded as a major achievement with aid contributions from international actors undoubtedly having played a part.

FRELIMO, as a party, has benefited from independence but has used the new system to consolidate power. Electoral and political party legislation play an important role in upholding the status quo. The infiltration of government staff into NGOs in combination with media campaigns to sway public perceptions about civil society and social movements have been harmful to any civil society resistance to the status quo. At the same time, targeted funding of selected NGOs legitimised the government and donor policies, and consultancy companies contracted to recruit civil society actors were likely to agree with government and donor policies.

As a result, we make the following recommendations:

1. Mozambique needs a solid and stable electoral legislation and strong judicial courts.

Both are necessary in order to rule and control illegalities during the elections phase.

2. The CNE and STAE need profound reforms to be able to complete their tasks.

Such reforms would allow them to perform their impartial role according to the rule of law and international guidelines for independent Electoral Commissions.

3. Mozambique's Parliament needs more qualified human resources and financial support.

This support is essential for the Parliament to accomplish its constitutional duties and responsibilities for overseeing the powers of the executive.

4. More capacity-building initiatives in legal matters (for example electoral law, decentralisation laws and regulations, drafting legislation, addressing court suits in proper order) are needed.

That is due to electoral and legal illiteracy and poverty, combined factors that compromise democracy among political parties in Mozambique and also in young democracies in the Southern Africa region, including the SADC countries. The partnership with lawyers admitted at the Mozambique Bar Association can be useful to address issues and help political parties to perform accordingly.

5. The Judiciary needs to be financially independent from the interference of executive powers and their impact on the trials of sensitive court cases (for example: *Caso de Dividas Ocultas*).

These are ongoing constraints that need to be challenged with courage and determination in favour of the rule of law and social democracy as outlined in the rules of the Constitution.

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