What happens after an election observation mission ends?
At a time when democracy is under increasing pressure worldwide, the real measure of success goes beyond the integrity of election day. When paired with long-term electoral assistance, institutional capacity-building, and support for local democratic actors, election observation can become a catalyst for lasting democratic reforms where recommendations are followed-up.
On 9 September 2026, the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) will bring together policymakers, election experts, and democracy practitioners at the European Parliament to explore this question through the case of Bangladesh. Hosted by MEP Ivars Ijabs, Chief Observer of the 2026 EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Bangladesh, the discussion will examine how EU election observation recommendations can contribute to meaningful, long-term reforms.
The event will highlight how the 2026 EU EOM and the AHEAD Bangladesh project—implemented by EPD, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), and the JAAGO Foundation with the support of the EU Delegation—have worked hand in hand to strengthen electoral integrity. From citizen election observation and civic participation to political dialogue and the implementation of EU EOM recommendations, Bangladesh offers a compelling example of how coordinated EU engagement can contribute to democratic transition.
9 September | 15:00 – 17:00 European Parliament, Room SPINELLI 5G1
The full programme and speakers will be available soon. If you have any questions about the event, get in touch with [email protected] or [email protected].
This event is organised as part of the EU-funded AHEAD Bangladesh project.
Across many democracies, there is growing recognition that successful reforms depend not only on institutional and legislative change but also on meaningful public participation, broad societal legitimacy and citizen trust. This broader trend is particularly relevant in the context of the Republic of Moldova’s EU accession process. The opening of the Fundamentals Cluster in Moldova’s EU accession negotiations on 15 June highlights that the enlargement process extends well beyond legislative alignment. It is equally about strengthening democratic governance, building accountable institutions and ensuring that reforms are informed by meaningful citizen participation.
The Citizens’ Assembly on Local Public Administration (LPA) Reform provides a timely example of how deliberative democracy can contribute to complex governance reforms in the context of EU enlargement. Hosted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and organised in cooperation with the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) and the Centre for Policies and Reforms (CPR Moldova), the Assembly brought together50 randomly selected citizens representing the country’s diversity in terms of age, gender, region and language. Over two weekends, participants heard evidence from experts, questioned public officials, debated among themselves and ultimately adopted 15 recommendations, each requiring the support of at least 70% of participants to ensure broad consensus.
The recommendations that emerged provide valuable insight into how informed citizens think about public administration, decentralisation and democratic governance. With the Government’s Concept of reform now before Parliament, the recommendations offer practical guidance on citizens’ priorities, implementation challenges and safeguards that could help ensure the reform is both effective and responsive to local realities.
A broadly constructive approach to deliberation
A striking feature of the Citizens’ Assembly was the tone of the discussions. Participants did not spend much time debating the principle of LPA reform. Instead, they concentrated on the practical questions of how to make it fair, transparent and effective. The recommendations suggest that participants recognised the potential benefits of modernising local governance but also identified a number of conditions necessary for success. These include ensuring equitable resource distribution, protecting smaller communities and minority groups, investing in infrastructure that connects newly amalgamated communities, preserving cultural infrastructure, ensuring access to public services, and safeguarding meaningful local representation. Citizens focused on identifying safeguards and implementation measures that would make reform fairer, more effective and more inclusive. This reflects a sophisticated understanding that successful governance reform is not about preserving existing structures but about improving outcomes for communities.
The Assembly offered a sophisticated understanding that successful governance reform is not about preserving existing structures but about improving outcomes for communities. The Assembly therefore offers a powerful lesson for the enlargement process: when citizens are informed and genuinely involved, they become constructive partners rather than obstacles to reform.
Fairness emerged as the Assembly’s central organising principle
Across all fifteen recommendations, equity stands out as the common thread. The first three recommendations all seek to prevent smaller or disadvantaged communities from being penalised by amalgamation. Participants proposed state financial support for localities unable to amalgamate voluntarily, legally guaranteed proportional distribution of resources within newly merged municipalities, and targeted assistance for villages wishing to amalgamate but rejected by larger neighbours. This revealed that citizens evaluate reform according to whether it distributes opportunities fairly across territories and not at the cost of territorial cohesion or equal treatment.
Citizens think in terms of services and representation, not administrative maps
Participants consistently focused on concrete outcomes affecting daily life. The recommendation calling for the state to finance roads connecting amalgamated localities illustrates this perspective. Citizens understood that larger municipalities may improve administrative capacity only if accompanied by investments ensuring that residents can actually reach schools, public services facilities, public offices and economic opportunities. Similarly, the recommendation to expand Unified Public Service Centres (CUPS) and mobile public services demonstrates that participants judge governance reform by its capacity to improve service delivery, not simply reorganising institutions.. This aligns closely with the principles for citizen-centred public administration, where accessibility and quality of services are key indicators of reform success.
Public communication and transparency viewed as a prerequisite for successful reform
Among the Assembly’s strongest recommendations is the call for a comprehensive public information strategy. Participants expressed concern that many citizens currently lack accessible, understandable information about local administration reform. Participants envisioned a multi-channel approach using simple language, printed materials, digital tools, SMS messages, public meetings, youth engagement and local social media. This emphasis suggests that participants understand reform implementation as a participatory process rather than a top-down exercise. They recognise that public understanding reduces misinformation, strengthens trust and enables citizens to make informed decisions about changes affecting their communities.
Minority rights and inclusion should be integral to the reform
The recommendations reveal a shared conception for inclusive governance. Participants called for reform-related information to be available in the languages spoken by Moldova’s ethnic communities, as effective participation requires linguistic accessibility. Participants also suggested giving special consideration to some geographically isolated localities with large ethnic minority populations when applying the rules on amalgamation. More broadly, they stressed that the reform should respect Moldova’s cultural and linguistic diversity and ensure that no community feels excluded from the process or its outcomes. These proposals indicate that citizens do not perceive administrative efficiency and cultural diversity as competing objectives. Instead, they view inclusive governance as a necessary condition for successful reform and social cohesion. In the broader context of EU accession, this resonates strongly with European values concerning minority protection, non-discrimination and participatory democracy.
Democratic representation matters
Participants repeatedly expressed concern that amalgamation could weaken representation for smaller villages and recommend institutional safeguards ensuring that every community continues to have an effective voice. Recommendations include creating clearly defined locality representatives, reforming electoral rules to ensure proportional representation, encouraging independent candidates from smaller settlements and guaranteeing transparency through livestreamed council meetings, rotating council sessions and outreach visits to constituent localities. These proposals demonstrate that participants expect reform to strengthen democratic accountability – as efficiency alone is insufficient if citizens feel disconnected from decision-making.
Protecting local identity while modernising governance
Several recommendations focus on preserving cultural infrastructures, including libraries, museums and community centres, and ensuring continued investment in local cultural life following amalgamation. This reflects an important insight often overlooked in administrative reform debates: local and cultural identity matter to citizens. Participants clearly agree that institutional modernisation should not come at the expense of community heritage or cultural participation and for modernised governance to preserve the social fabric of local communities.
Economic justice is central to public legitimacy
The Assembly also devoted attention to fiscal arrangements. Participants worried that amalgamation with larger urban areas could trigger sudden increases in local taxes and therefore proposed differentiated taxation mechanisms reflecting local economic conditions. They also recommended redirecting personal income tax revenues according to residents’ place of residence rather than employer registration, enabling communities to benefit more directly from the economic activity of their inhabitants. These recommendations reveal a nuanced understanding of fiscal decentralisation and suggest that citizens see budgetary fairness as essential for maintaining confidence in reform.
A tool for accession reform
The Citizens’ Assembly offers important lessons beyond local government reform itself. EU accession requires extensive legislative alignment, but lasting transformation depends on whether reforms enjoy public understanding and legitimacy. Deliberative processes like Citizens’ Assemblies help bridge this gap by creating informed spaces where citizens can examine evidence, challenge assumptions, understand trade-offs and formulate balanced recommendations.
As Moldova advances towards European Union membership, the experience suggests that Citizens’ Assemblies can strengthen both the ownership and effectiveness of accession-related reforms. This experience demonstrates that randomly selected citizens, when provided with balanced information and sufficient time, are capable of producing sophisticated and constructive policy proposals that closely align with many of the governance principles underpinning European integration: transparency, subsidiarity, inclusion, accountability, fairness and citizen participation. This experience also reflects a broader evolution in democratic practice across Europe. In 2023, the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation on deliberative democracy, the first international standard dedicated to this form of citizen participation. The Recommendation recognises that deliberative processes can complement representative democracy and sets out principles such as fair representation, informed participation, transparency, accountability and evaluation to guide their design and implementation.
The Citizens’ Assembly has been hosted by the Parliament of Moldova and organised in cooperation with EPD and CPR Moldova with funding from the European Union through the “INSPIRED Moldova” project and from the Government of Sweden through the “Strategic Partnership Approach to a Conducive Environment (SPACE) Initiative”. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the European Union or Government of Sweden.
The EU’s recently published Tech Sovereignty Package is the first comprehensive framework put forward to address the EU’s strategic dependency on foreign tech and foster – you guessed it – EU tech sovereignty. But what exactly do we mean by tech sovereignty?
While there is no consensus on the concept of tech sovereignty, it is broadly understood as an effort to reduce the EU’s dependency on foreign tech and build a competitive domestic tech sector. The text itself does not explicitly define the term, but refers to it as a mostly economic and geographic concept, grounded in: “openness, partnership and fair competition”. This definition serves to relay any critique of EU protectionism, but falls short of mentioning on which values it should be based.
At first glance, tech sovereignty and the organisational structure of tech companies don’t appear to be closely linked to democratic principles. The package frames tech sovereignty almost entirely through competitiveness and economic security, with democratic accountability largely overlooked. Overall, civil society and fundamental rights are conspicuously absent from the picture, with stakeholder consultations overwhelmingly industry-driven and fundamental rights impact assessments exclusively focusing on freedom to conduct business and the protection of personal data. There are a few exceptions, in particular, the endorsement of open source and procurement criteria that go beyond purely economic considerations and open the door to a broader conversation about democratic-by-design digital infrastructure.
While the Tech Sovereignty Package is framed as first and foremost an industrial policy tool, tech policy precedents such as the Digital Services Act and Artificial Intelligence Act have shown that it is perfectly possible to integrate democratic values and accountability into instruments with an industrial rationale. In fact, it further strengthens such legislation by embedding it in democratic standards.
This analysis will show how the Tech Sovereignty Package could do the same.
Main elements of the package -or- Tech Sovereignty 101
The EU’s Tech Sovereignty Package is a set of 4 legislative and non-legislative initiatives aimed at boosting the EU’s competitiveness, resilience, and strategic autonomy in the tech sector. It includes the following proposals:
Chips Act 2.0, a regulation to address the EU’s dependency on foreign-produced semiconductors;
While this package is framed as industrial policy, it also poses significant implications for democracy. European countries are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure controlled by companies whose business models and governance structures are often incompatible with democratic principles, whether they are European or not. For this reason, the EU’s push for digital sovereignty is not just an economic question: it is an opportunity to ask how democratic values can be meaningfully embedded into the infrastructure that underpins our lives.
In the next paragraphs we will look into the main elements of the different initiatives more in detail and what that means for democratic governance – with the exception of the Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI and Energy, which is less relevant to our analysis.
Chips Act 2.0
The Chips Act 2.0 is a proposed regulation to address the EU’s dependency on foreign-produced semiconductors and a follow-up to the original European Chips Act, aimed at correcting the shortcomings of the first initiative, according to the Commission’s own assessment.
Semiconductors are materials, such as silicon, that are required to manufacture chips, the basic components essential to modern electronics, and by extension powering the infrastructure of modern life. Unlike many other products, manufacturing semiconductors is highly dependent on highly specialised knowledge, equipment and skills, rather than raw materials. The biggest players in this field are Taiwan, which produces the vast majority of the world’s chips, and the US, which leads in chip design. The EU, by contrast, is heavily dependent on third-country suppliers with nearly 80% headquartered outside the EU. This vulnerability is felt increasingly amid geopolitical shifts that have seen the EU at odds with longstanding allies, such as the United States.
This is why the EU is addressing the issue with regulation fostering research, skills and coordination. In practice, however, the Chips Act 2.0 is primarily a governance framework and does not bring significant new investment. Its main tools are coordination mechanisms, administrative simplification and crisis response procedures to address supply chain disruptions, such as during the Covid-19 pandemic and the most recent blockage of the Strait of Hormuz.
A Chips to Europe initiative 2.0, which provides funding for innovation, mostly referring to existing Horizon and Digital Europe funding schemes or deferring to the new MFF.
A framework for European semiconductor initiatives & strategic projects which will benefit from specific permit granting and procurement rules and could have access to specific labels.
A crisis response mechanism with monitoring and coordination to address supply chain issues.
A governance framework with a European Semiconductor Board, national competent authorities and Industrial Alliance for Semiconductors.
Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA)
The Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) is considered the most significant initiative in the package, with the objective of promoting cloud and AI innovation in Europe. Like the Chips Act 2.0, it is primarily a governance framework, but it contains some very innovative elements.
The most concrete is the cloud computing sovereignty framework, which establishes a rating system with four assurance levels to show how “sovereign” a cloud service is, based on criteria around data location, supply chain control, cybersecurity and exposure to foreign jurisdiction. Public contracting authorities are obliged to procure at level 1 (the lowest rating), and if their activities have “public order relevance” they must use level 2, 3, or 4 only. Non-price criteria for procurement are also included, such as the “Union added value”, like in the Chips Act 2.0. Finally, the proposal adds an open source preference for EU entities, pushing public bodies towards transparent and auditable solutions over proprietary ones. The significance of these two inclusions will be elaborated on further on in this article.
Cloud and AI Leadership Initiatives promote research and innovation in the cloud and AI sectors with binding obligations for member states, including the adoption of national cloud and AI strategies and the establishment of Experience and Acceleration Centres for AI across their territories.
On the sovereignty side, Title IV introduces the four assurance levels, with detailed technical and legal criteria set out in Annex II, that underpins procurement decisions across the public sector.
The EuroCloud Federation is established, a novel mechanism allowing public sector bodies to share idle data centre capacity across borders, reducing duplication and making better collective use of existing public infrastructure
Communication on European Tech Sovereignty and Open Source Strategy
On the one hand, the Communication on European Tech Sovereignty gives an overview of the different actions taken and an explainer of the package as a whole. More notably, however, it introduces an Open Source Strategy to promote open source software as a best practice model for the use of technological applications in the EU, particularly in the public sector.
Open source typically refers to software whose source code is made publicly available, enabling its use, modification, and redistribution for free. This has great advantages in terms of transparency, accountability, and innovation; but also in terms of democratic participation because of its accessibility and because it allows a process of co-creation, with anyone being potentially able to edit and improve the source code.
Publicprocurement is put forward as the main tool to promote open source solutions based on the principle of “public money, public code” in areas such as digital communication, workplace services, software development and AI. This would mean that technological solutions supported by public money must be open source, which is a long-standing advocacy point of the digital rights community. The strategy also explicitly mentions the example set by open source social media and decentralised social media solutions such as Mastodon.
The strategy also outlines an approach to embed the goals of openness and sovereignty-by-design in digital investments and project lifecycles by integrating assessment criteria into governance structures to ensure that control, interoperability, portability, and sustainability considerations are systematically evaluated from the earliest design stages.
Out of the four initiatives, the open source strategy is the only one that mentions EU values explicitly more consistently and sets out a vision on how tech sovereignty should be achieved. In particular by “reinforcing the ‘European way’ to technological sovereignty” which includes “a human-centric approach that upholds EU values such as safety, security, transparency, human oversight, respect for fundamental rights, inclusivity, equality, non-discrimination and accessibility”. This is an important political commitment to democratic tech, and extends to the other initiatives given that the Communication serves as an explainer for the whole ETS package.
A definition of tech sovereignty mentioning that it should be in line with “interests and values” of the EU both within the Union and outside through the Global Gateway investment strategy.
Strong endorsement of open source models as a best practice for public interest technologies including for public private partnerships, and using models such as steward foundations to ensure the economic viability.
Public procurement to be put forward as the main strategy to encourage open source solutions.
Enter democracy: recommendations for democracy entry points
While the Tech Sovereignty package is an important step towards addressing the EU’s strategic dependence, it consistently lacks considerations on how to integrate democratic principles into the fabric of the EU tech sector. There are a few mentions of democracy in the Open Source Strategy, a blanket remark that the EU protects democratic principles in the CADA, and no reference at all in the Chips Act 2.0.
And yet, there are many questions that are raised by the EU’s quest to tech sovereignty, that don’t only pertain to competitiveness or economic security, but touch on the core of democracy. Who gets a voice in how essential services are designed and governed? What prevents a European cloud from being just as extractive as a foreign one, simply under a different flag? How to ensure that the production of semiconductors and other soft/hardware is done in the common interest? Who controls open source foundations?
These are difficult questions, but ones that are worth asking. For these reasons, we have identified in the next section several areas as ‘democracy entry points’ where we could better integrate democratic values in a concrete way and start answering such difficult questions (see table).
Democracy entry point
Recommendations
1
Open source strategy
The promotion of open source is an endorsement of participatory, democratic-by-design models. There is however no indication of specific organisational models for open source companies / foundations.
Develop specific guidelines with recommendations of models that promote democratic governance and suggest what models are the most appropriate for which part of the tech sector.
2
Chips Act 2.0, CADA
Non-price criteria are introduced for public procurement as ‘EU added value’. That, however, only takes into account the added value for the economy.
Introduce guidelines and additional requirements or guidelines for non-price criteria, such as that activities are conducted in the public interest, common good, or that they adopt specific, more democratic structures.
3
Chips Act 2.0
Some projects are considered as ‘strategic’ and hence prioritised in terms of investments. They are also identified as a purely economic notion.
The possibility to exclude certain entities from strategic projects on semiconductors according to Recital 55 of the Chips Act 2.0 should be also linked to their lack of respect for democratic principles, fundamental rights and adoption of non democratic structures.
4
Chips Act 2.0
Semiconductor technology initiatives can only be conducted by ‘domestic’ undertakings(as only criterion).
European semiconductor technology initiatives should meet additional criteria other than being domestic, including the adoption of democratic structures that reduce concentration of power and respect of fundamental rights.
5
CADA
Assurance levels to certify tech sovereignty of certain entities for procurement include not only geographic considerations, but also cybersecurity and data protection requirements, but don’t go as far as including democratic principles.
Introduce democratic accountability as a criterion that could be inserted into procurement frameworks or certification schemes.
1. Organisational models for open source solutions
As mentioned above, the Open Source Strategy is the most groundbreaking of the three initiatives, taking a clear stance in promoting open source, and showing that it is possible to take such stances even as part of industrial policy initiatives. As mentioned before, open source is not only a technical solution, but also a known model to unlock more participation, transparency and democratic accountability in the tech sector.
The text reiterates that tech sovereignty and the promotion of open source will be done following the “European way”, meaning a set of principles and values that would guide economic activities in the EU. While this is welcome, it is possible to get even more concrete in terms of organisational structures to ensure the respect of democratic standards.
The Open Source Strategy mentions that open source projects operate under various models, for example:
independent, volunteer driven, and informal networks, sometimes hosted by foundations;
projects managed by large companies (mostly non-European) that use open source for their core products but add proprietary layers for monetisation;
and dedicated ‘pure open source’ companies that install, maintain and provide support services; and
The package also mentions that it will support open source stewardship, which could be for example a foundation that would pool in the resources for, and coordinate, open source projects.
This would be an interesting opportunity to further recommend specific organisational models that are, by design, more democratic. Some have been mentioned already, like foundation-led models and private public partnerships, but there is more to explore, such as cooperatives and media-inspired models.
For these reasons, the Tech Sovereignty Package could be complemented by specific guidelines with recommendations of models that promote democratic governance and suggest what models are the most appropriate for which part of the tech sector.
💡 Recommendation
Develop by specific guidelines with recommendations of models that promote democratic governance and suggest what models are the most appropriate for which part of the tech sector.
2. EU added value as a non-price criterion for procurement
Both the Chips Act 2.0 and the CADA mention EU added value as an additional criterion for initiatives that should be incentivised at EU level, for example through public procurement. The inclusion of non-price criteria for procurement, as well as the reference to the public interest in the Chips Act 2.0, are important elements to show that the cost of investment is not exclusively monetary.
An important acknowledgement in itself, this argument is currently focused on the economic added value and can be further strengthened by offering a suggested framework of non-price criteria, including basic democratic principles and fundamental rights.
Additional requirements could be also taken into account as EU added value such as that activities are conducted in the public interest, for the common good or that they adopt specific, more democratic structures. For more information on democratic tech structures, you can find EPD’s most recent analysis here.
💡 Recommendation
Introduce additional requirements or guidelines to non-price criteria, such as that activities are conducted in the public interest, common good or that they adopt specific, more democratic structures.
3. Definition of strategic projects as a priority
In the Chips Act 2.0 “strategic projects” are introduced that would be considered as a priority for investments and supported by a mix of private and public funding. Strategic projects are also picked based on their “EU added value”, according to Article 16, and certain entities can be restricted or excluded “where this would be contrary to the Union’s strategic assets, interests, autonomy or security” (Recital 55).
The possibility of exclusions is a very strong addition to the package and an interesting opportunity to be explored further. The possibility to exclude certain entities could, for example, be linked to their lack of respect for democratic principles, fundamental rights and adoption of non democratic structures.
💡 Recommendation
The possibility to exclude certain entities from strategic projects on semiconductors according to Recital 55 of the Chips Act 2.0 should be also linked to their lack of respect for democratic principles, fundamental rights and adoption of non democratic structures.
4. European semiconductor technology initiatives and domestic undertakings
The Chips Act 2.0 includes further criteria for European semiconductor technology initiatives, in particular stating that a European semiconductor technology initiative should be carried out by domestic undertakings (Article 14), showing a clear preference beyond economic considerations. “Domestic” is defined in Article 2(31) as having its seat in the EU and being under the ownership and control of an EU undertaking.
While the effort to promote the EU domestic industry and reduce dependency is important in a competitive and geopolitical sense, promoting organisations and companies just for being European doesn’t automatically solve many of the problems that we face today in terms of democratic accountability. This is another good opportunity to introduce additional criteria such as the adoption of democratic structures that reduce concentration of power and promote the respect of fundamental rights.
💡 Recommendation
European semiconductor technology initiatives should meet additional criteria other than being domestic-owned, including the adoption of democratic structures that reduce concentration of power and respect of fundamental rights.
5. Criteria and risk assessments for sovereignty assurance levels
One of the most crucial elements of the whole package is the procurement framework in the CADA, Title IV, introducing a ranking system of four assurance levels showing how ‘sovereign’ an undertaking should be to be considered for public procurement. This is an important step, showing that it is possible to include criteria on which ‘models’ to promote – also exemplified by the explicit mention of open source.
Recital 16 also mentions that frontier AI technologies have become critical strategic assets. For this reason, it is essential to strengthen the EU’s tech sovereignty to ensure that the transition to AI is aligned with democratic values. Nevertheless, the identification of main risks posed by lack of sovereignty doesn’t touch upon democratic principles, but exclusively on “economic security risks”, with the sole addition of risks to the protection of personal data as a fundamental right (Recital 63).
In this context, we would suggest going further and introducing democratic accountability as a criterion that could be inserted into procurement frameworks or certification schemes.
💡 Recommendation
Introduce democratic accountability as a criterion that could be inserted into procurement frameworks or certification schemes.
Conclusion
The Tech Sovereignty Package is a meaningful step forward and shows early signs of integrating democratic governance considerations into industrial policy, but it also remains overwhelmingly focused on economic competitiveness. The EU should have a clear vision of what European tech looks like in terms of democratic accountability, fundamental rights, and the public interest – and embed concrete democratic values not just into individual legislative texts, but into its broader approach to industrial policy. This could be done by identifying concrete opportunities to link specific tools with democratic values, both in these proposals and upcoming ones.
After all, digital infrastructure at this scale has the ability to deeply affect democratic structures and should therefore be constructed to serve the common good, not the interests of a handful of corporations or governments.
Explore the timeline and discover the key milestones shaping the future of digital democracy in Europe →
The fifth edition of the European Democracy Support Annual Review points to a mixed and often hesitant European response to mounting democratic challenges worldwide in 2025.
The inversion of US foreign policy from supporting democracy to backing autocracy dominated debates throughout 2025. There were many statements about the EU’s geopolitical salience as a democracy defender, but European governments were focused on bolstering their security and economic interests in this uncertain context, and in some cases, this stance led to clear-cut investment in democracy.
“Measured against the shock of an inversion in US policies, changes in European policies were significant but perhaps not as far-reaching as might have been expected or warranted.”
Key findings
While a handful of European countries stepped in after USAID funding cuts, major donors – including France, the UK, and Germany – announced reduction to development and democracy aid.
Despite turbulent geopolitical change, no major new democracy strategies were introduced in 2025.
Europe increasingly prioritised defending democratic norms at home, while scaling back ambition abroad.
The EU deepened cooperation with many autocratic regimes and declined to respond in any critical manner to many clear attacks on democratic norms.
What were the EU’s five best and worst moves for democracy?
The five clearest pro-democracy steps:
Moldova: The EU supported Moldova to uphold a democratic election.
Enlargement: Democracy concerns became more prominent in the EU enlargement process.
Democratic conditionality: The EU took steps to strengthen democratic conditionality within the union via the rule of law under the new multiyear budget.
DSA: The EU continued with application of the Digital Services Act despite pressure from US tech companies and the Trump administration.
Democracy Shield: The EU launched the European Democracy Shield, which included advances and new measures.
The five worst developments for democracy:
Palestine: The EU was equivocal in its support for Palestinian democratic self-determination and failed to rein in Israeli attacks.
MFF: The democracy budget disappeared from the proposal for the EU’s next multiyear budget.
Aid cuts: EU member states cut aid for democracy projects.
Protests: The EU gave a weak response to multiple democracy protests across the world.
Democracy Shield: The European Democracy Shield contained unaddressed weaknesses.
About the Annual Review
Published by the European Democracy Hub – a joint initiative of Carnegie Europe and the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), the European Democracy Support Annual Review provides a comprehensive overview of policies and initiatives implemented by the EU and European governments.
The European Democracy Support Annual Review is the flagship publication of the European Democracy Hub – a joint initiative of Carnegie Europe and the European Partnership for Democracy.
For the first time, 38 citizens from across the country – randomly selected, representing diverse regions, socio-economic backgrounds, languages, genders, and ages – took part in a Citizens’ Assembly to jointly develop recommendations on preventing the risks of disinformation to democracy and on strengthening the rule of law. The shared proposals adopted by the Assembly reflect a broad consensus on the need for concrete action against disinformation and highlight the importance of the solutions identified by participants to protect Moldova’s democracy. Citizens’ assemblies are a widely used method of democratic participation. They enable ordinary people to be actively involved in decision-making, with authorities taking their recommendations into account.
The Assembly in action
During the Citizens’ Assembly, participants worked in groups with the support of facilitators, exploring questions such as: what does democracy mean to them; how does disinformation affect their daily lives; and how can Moldovan society become more resilient in the face of this phenomenon.
Discussions were enriched through dialogues with media and human rights experts, including the Ombudsman of the Republic of Moldova. These experts engaged with the groups by answering questions, offering practical examples, challenging assumptions, and linking the discussions to broader democratic debates within the country and international legal frameworks.
On the second day of the Assembly, citizens interacted directly with high-level representatives of key public institutions, such as the Audiovisual Council, the Presidency, MPs from parliamentary committees on national security and education, and the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation. Citizen groups addressed them questions which helped shape and clarify the final recommendations.
Participants explored different ways to tackle disinformation, from the critical role of education in developing responsible media consumption skills, to potential measures against those who create and spread false information. They discussed how disinformation undermines public trust and family bonds, emphasising the need to protect citizens from its risks and to support efforts to prevent disinformation.
Drafting and adopting shared recommendations
Final recommendations were adopted with the support of at least 70% of participants. This high approval threshold aligns with international standards and ensures that each recommendation benefits from strong collective backing.
The diversity of views brought added value to the deliberative process and led to broad consensus on the recommendations, demonstrating the power of dialogue and shared reflection in finding solutions to strengthen democratic resilience. At the end of the two days of work, these were the adopted recommendations:
State institutions should ensure transparency in decision-making processes, keeping citizens well-informed and actively engaged in national political life, supported by robust fact-checking mechanisms and consistent communication at local, regional, and national levels. (38 votes in favour – unanimity)
Participants stressed the urgent need for greater transparency and trustworthy information to rebuild public trust and counter the rapid spread of disinformation. They emphasised that a proactive approach from state institutions is vital to respond to the threats that disinformation poses to democratic stability.
The Ministry of Education and Research should introduce a dedicated module on disinformation within social studies classes and information technology education, as part of the national curriculum, targeting both lower and upper secondary education pupils. (36 in favour, 1 abstention, 1 against)
The panel agreed on the essential need to provide children and young people with opportunities, through education, to develop skills to identify, resist, and report disinformation.
The Parliamentary Committee for Media, in partnership with civil society, should support the creation of a specialised department within the Audiovisual Council dedicated to countering online disinformation. This department should be responsible for monitoring digital content and coordinating with social media platforms to implement appropriate measures — such as issuing warnings, fines, and recommendations to suspend accounts where necessary. It should also serve as a channel for receiving and processing citizen complaints via themed filters, while promoting accurate information and raising public awareness of the risks and impacts of disinformation. (30 in favour, 4 abstentions, 4 against)
Participants stressed the need for an independent, specialised body capable of delivering a rapid and coordinated response to online disinformation, combining enforcement responsibilities with citizen engagement, especially given the lack of social media regulation in Moldova.
State institutions should support the efforts of experts and journalists in tackling the spread of false information online.(34 in favour, 4 abstentions, 0 against)
The Assembly highlighted the essential role of experts and journalists in urgently addressing disinformation, underscoring their vital mission in preserving a truthful and resilient information environment.
These recommendations will be submitted to the relevant institutions, including Moldovan authorities, Parliament, and other national and international organisations.
An innovative mechanism for inclusive public dialogue
Citizens’ assemblies are a form of participatory democracy that bring together a diverse and representative segment of society to address complex issues through thoughtful deliberation. Rooted in the principles of inclusion, informed dialogue, and consensus-based deliberation, these assemblies create a unique space where citizens engage with each other and with experts to formulate practical recommendations to address public challenges. This model has already proven effective in countries like Ireland, Spain, and Belgium – influencing decisions on climate action, urban planning, or social policies, for instance – and is increasingly being adopted worldwide as a means of revitalising democracy.
Testing this method in Moldova offers a fresh perspective on a complex issue by piloting consultations and consensus-based decision-making, while encouraging constructive dialogue. At a time when trust in political and social institutions is declining globally, Moldova’s first Citizens’ Assembly aims to promote mutual understanding and to rebuild trust in the power of collective action.
The Assembly was organised as part of the INSPIRED Moldova project, funded by the European Union and implemented by the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), the European Association for Local Democracy (ALDA), the National Assistance and Information Centre for NGOs in Moldova CONTACT, the Centre for Policies and Reforms (CPR Moldova), Democracy Reporting International (DRI), and People in Need (PIN). The views expressed during the event do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Union.
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For media inquiries, please contact the organisers from the European Partnership for Democracy ([email protected] , +373 69 280 1455) or CPR Moldova ([email protected])
The final conference on Combating Disinformation in the Western Balkans brought together experts, civil society, and institutional representatives to address one of the most pressing challenges of our time.
This conference marked the conclusion of the ‘Combatting Disinformation in the Western Balkans (CDWB)‘ project, which has been tackling the rising influence of disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, and Serbia. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, disinformation in the region surged, fueled by polarisation, skepticism towards EU integration, and state-controlled media. The project aimed to counter this through citizen engagement, media education, and strengthening fact-checking, while promoting regional cooperation to address these systemic challenges.
The panels engaged indiscussions on manipulative narratives, the role of legislation, the potential of AI, and innovative tools like citizen assemblies to foster democratic resilience. While significant progress has been made, it’s clear that sustained political will and collaboration are essential to truly combat disinformation and protect democratic values in the region.
Underscoring key takeaways
During the panel on election disinformation, Jelena Danilović (Analyst, Atlantic Council of Montenegro) emphasised how “manipulative narratives significantly distort public opinion during elections in the Western Balkans.”Teodora Ćurčić, Data journalist and investigative reporter at CINS, stressed the importance of not just establishing regulations but ensuring they are enforced effectively. This reflects the ongoing challenge of addressing disinformation in the region, where strong laws exist but are often inadequately applied. Finally, citizens assemblies were presented as a key innovative tool to support democracy and combat disinformation in the Western Balkans. While assemblies blend direct and representative democracy, transparency is crucial to ensure they don’t backfire. Adriana Buchiu, representative of the Parliamentary Support and Capacity Building Unit at the European Parliament stressed the importance of managing expectations when it comes to these assemblies: “We must explain to citizens why not all of their recommendations can be implemented” as they ultimately depend on parliament and government.
A Roadmap to combat disinformation
Following 4 national citizen assemblies organised in the framework of the CDWB project, 16 national level policy dialogues and 2 regional policy dialogues, theproject has developed a comprehensive roadmap for regional cooperation on combatting disinformation.
This roadmap identifies 9 key challenges, with a total of 36 actionable points:
Challenge 1: Strengthening the regulatory and institutional framework in which media operate.
Challenge 2: Enhancing media and information literacy among citizens in the Western Balkans region.
Challenge 3: Incorporating approaches to countering disinformation in education systems.
Challenge 4: Building resilience against Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), including the media sphere and election campaigns.
Challenge 5: Strengthening self-regulatory mechanisms of the media.
Challenge 6: Addressing declining trust in public institutions through citizen participation.
Challenge 7: Reducing polarising public narratives, including hate speech.
Challenge 8: Strengthening funding mechanisms for public broadcasters and public interest media.
Challenge 9: Improving the veracity of information of public interest and countering the dissemination of (intentionally) false narratives in the form of mis- or disinformation.
The Roadmap is currently being finalised to incorporate the valuable feedback received during the conference and will be shared with national policy-makers in tailored in-person discussions in each capital.
*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
In the last couple of years, the end of June has marked the start of the EPD’s Annual Conference. In a year full of dynamics, the doors were open to discuss the most prominent topic: elections.
After digesting election results across the continent, and a few cookies from the permanent coffee corners from the venues’ elegant main hall, speakers, moderators and EPD’s session leads found their way to stimulating breakout sessions, including the discussion on disinformation and elections in the Western Balkans and the EU, which gave a taste of the challenges faced across the continent.
The rapid spread of disinformation distorts people’s perception of truth, devouring our identities, values and sense of place in the world, Omri Preiss, Alliance4Europe’s Executive Director, pointed out after RasKRIKavanje’s journalist Milica Ljubičić shared examples of the 1150 manipulations of information identified by RasKRIKavanje in monitoring the front pages of Serbia’s six largest newspapers in 2023. Unconstrained by geographic boundaries, the information space is susceptible to internal and external influences. Even though we do not have complete control over our own information space, we must do what is within our control, which is strengthening our institutional capacity. Therefore, ‘‘support should be given to information space actors, such as journalists, by reinforcing their capacities, supporting investigative journalism, and improving media literacy.’’ – Irène Mingasson, Head of Unit, Rapid Response Europe, Asia and America at the European Commission, added to the discussion.
Ending with a pinch of optimism as soon as tips, tools, and best practices began to be shared, many of these supported by the EU funded project ‘Combatting Disinformation in the Western Balkans (CDWB), the panel could not have ended with a better flourish than with the Ethical Journalism Awards closing ceremony. Four journalists from the Western Balkans were awarded for their work on truthful reporting and for embracing ethical journalism principles and leading by example in media reporting in the region.
The awards were part of the #CheckitFirst campaign, run by ARTICLE 19 within the framework of the EU funded project ‘‘Combatting Disinformation in the Western Balkans (CDWB)’’ in which EPD is a partner. This project aims to tackle foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro and Serbia by:
Engaging citizens in awareness campaigns and media literacy,
Analysing disinformation patterns and media ethics for advocacy,
Improving national and regional regulations while safeguarding freedom of expression, and
Building fact-checking skills to enhance media accountability and reliability.
This article is an investigation into a vote buying scheme in Serbia. It entails first hand solid evidence of the role of call center’s agencies in vote buying processes as well as it tries to raise awareness that such methods and schemes exist in Serbia.
This article aims to raise awareness about harmful traditional practices like hymenoplasty. Unnecessary and harmful medical procedures undermine basic ethical principles and the health of female patients, and hymenoplasty is even advertised on the websites of some clinics.
This article conducts a thorough investigation of potential high-level corruption of coal exploitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina which has increased several times compared to previous years.
This article investigates the consequences of revenge porn, while also addressing Balkan systemic patriarchal traditions. The article urges the immediate need to take action in raising awareness as well as creating a legal framework to protect victims of revenge porn.
The Ethical Journalism Awards ceremony was part of a study visit to Brussels and London where the awarded journalists had the opportunity to exchange views and experiences with each other and experts in the media field, and discuss how to improve ethical journalism in their countries. But, safeguarding truth in a digital age is not an easy task, in fact ”being a fact checker is not easy especially during political campaigns as there is constant propaganda”, as Milica Ljubičić highlighted during the conference session, especially because it’s not just about truth, it’s about the ability to discern if the sources are legitimate or bots, Omri Preiss concluded in his final remarks.
With the proliferation of FIMI in the Western Balkans due to the rise of digital technologies, and amidst increasing challenges in fact-checking, the CDWB project aims to contribute to tackling disinformation in the Western Balkans through citizen recommendations, media monitoring, policy dialogue and awareness raising. The project will present a conference on the 1sth of October 2024 during its final conference ‘‘Democracy in an Age of Disinformation: Insights and Responses from the Western Balkans’’ in Montenegro.
*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
The EU System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society (EU SEE) programme seeks to support civil society to thrive by preventing efforts to restrict civic space and shut down civil society organisations.
Agreement signed by Jutta Urpilainen, European Commissioner for International Partnerships in the European Commission together with civil society leaders
The programme named the EU System for an Enabling Environment (EU SEE) will be implemented by 9 civil society organisations with a global outreach across 4 continents
EU SEE seeks to anticipate and address threats to civil society in 86 countries across the globe, providing timely information to networks and the EU to facilitate advocacy actions
It provides financial support mechanisms to civil society organisations including those most marginalised in decision making processes
A new partnership between the European Union and a consortium of 9 civil society organisations (CSOs) has been signed today by EU Commissioner for International Partnerships in the European Commission, Jutta Urpilainen, alongside several leaders of civil society organisations.
Commissioner for International Partnerships Jutta Urpilainen said: “Civil society is a key partner for the European Union in delivering sustainable impact for communities through Global Gateway.I am proud to launch with our partners the EU System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, an innovative global programme to monitor potential threats to civic space and strengthen the ability of local actors to respond proactively, through solidarity, advocacy and dialogue with state authorities.”
EU SEE aims to promote an enabling environment for civil society in 86 countries across the globe. Led by civil society, this innovative mechanism brings together national, regional and global networks to monitor the laws and administrative practices as well as the digital and media environments which provide the context for civil society operations.
In countries where participating monitors issue alerts on restrictive actions, EU SEE will aim to provide funds and solidarity networks to local organisations to mount campaigns, or strengthen their internal systems to withstand threats to their operations.
EU SEE began its work in 2024 as an innovative response to the ever increasing restrictions on civic space. Across the world, in both authoritarian states and established democracies, citizens engaged collectively in policy, advocacy and community work frequently face diverse restrictions on their rights to form associations and organise, or are prevented from freely expressing their views. Through repressive NGO laws and administrative red tape, civil society organisations find their expertise and knowledge ignored and their doors closed as they are excluded from decision-making processes.
Through a chain of actions encompassing monitoring at the national level, resulting in early warnings, which in turn provide timely assistance to groups in need, EU SEE aims to support civil society in preventing and proactively responding to legal and policy developments that may impact their ability to operate.
The project has been designed with the broad participation of partner NGOs, and it aims to reach a diverse set of groups such as those outside of main capitals and those representing marginalised communities including civil society organisations headed by women, youth and other vulnerable groups.
The EU SEE speaks to the commitment of the European Union to support civil society organisations, including those at the forefront of human rights violations, to push back against civic space restrictions and create a more enabling environment.
At a time when restrictions seem to be on the increase even in established democracies, the legacy of the EU SEE Programme will help prevent repressive tactics and strengthen solidarity, advocacy and dialogue with state authorities.
The EU SEE programme comprises two main components designed to address these challenges. The first one seeks to set up and implement a civil society monitoring index and Early Warning Mechanism that would detect situations where the enabling environment is deteriorating or improving; it is led by Hivos. The second complementary component of the system responds with flexible and timely financial support for civil society organisations through its Flexible Support Mechanism; it is led by Oxfam. This mechanism supports civil society in advocating for a sustained enabling environment, developing systems of resilience, and protecting organisations and individuals. By detecting restrictions on time and responding preemptively, the system will contribute to the creation of a supportive environment for civil society to operate. The EU System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society is funded by the European Commission. For more information about EU activities in support of Enabling Environment see Capacity4Dev.
Photo credits: Directorate General for International Partnerships.
On 6 November, the European Parliament, Council of EU and European Commission reached a political agreementon the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. The proposal was presented by the European Commission as part of the European Democracy Action Plan to complement the Digital Services Act on the specific issue of transparency of political advertising online. The Regulation aims to address various concerns posed by the emergence of online political advertising such as a lack of transparency on individual ads and campaigns alike, the abuse of personal data and potential exploitation of these gaps by political actors.
As the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), we welcome the achievement of a political agreement and closure of a file which has the potential to bring more transparency and protection of personal data in the online political ads ecosystem. At the same time we are concerned to see that many shortcomings that we had highlighted throughout the legislative process are still present in this final text.
We went through the main elements in the final text on political advertising, highlighting what are the positive elements, the shortcomings and putting forward recommendations for improvement.
With the vote in the plenary of the European Parliament on the European Media Freedom Act just around the corner, the state advertising provision under Article 24 still remains a challenge as it does not require full and meaningful transparency from authorities when allocating public resources to media service providers. Therefore, we and other 14 organisations call for:
No reintroduction of the “1 million inhabitants” threshold for publishing information regarding state advertising.
An EU-wide online database of state advertising that is easily accessible.
Full inclusion of emergency messages in the concept of state advertising.
Regular and mandatory reporting obligations for authorities, the result of which must be available to relevant independent and accountable regulators.
Monitoring of state advertising and state aid allocation.
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